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PREFACE
Following World War II the interests of great nations 
converged in the Mediterranean. Seemingly a small and insig­
nificant country, Greece became the center of British and 
American policies which created conditions that have almost 
obscured actual events. Contemporary Americans knew and re­
sponded to the Greek situation as evidenced in Presidential 
correspondence for the period. These messages reflect both 
the British and American postwar role, and successfully place 
a small nation's people in deserved perspective. In Greece, 
a portion of the population desired active participation in 
government. But their nationalist leaders expressed ideas and 
employed rhetoric associated with accepted versions of Soviet 
communism, and at the same time they pleaded for "Laocratia," 
or true democracy. Intentions became increasingly misunder­
stood, and the EAM movement, in the minds of British and Amer­
ican policy makers, was tied to the Soviet Union*s desire to 
dominate Greece. Responding to believed Soviet intentions 
and their own national interests, Britain and the United 
States came to support a reactionary and royalist Greek gov­
ernment, which in its effort to maintain the status quo re­
pressed civil liberties and thwarted democratic change.
Within Greece the EAM was mainly supported by common 
people whose aim was to achieve representative government. 
To gain the viewpoint of ordinary American citizens, correspon­
dence including letters and telegrams to Presidents Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman were chosen for study. These 
messages from obscure and influential individuals as well as 
organizations, offer new insight and knowledge on changing 
American opinion as this nation adopted an increasingly inter­
national role. Also, research incorporating Presidential cor­
respondence against a background of foreign relations, pro­
vides valuable information on the relation of opinion and 
policy in a democracy. The study begins in 1944, when mail 
to Roosevelt expressed concern over British actions in Greece, 
and the violation of the principle of self-determination for 
liberated nations. But postwar events in the Balkans obscured 
and confused liberal beliefs, and in addition, Greek-Americans 
increasingly petitioned their government to support the aspi­
rations of a royalist Greek government. As a result ethnic 
opinion influenced that of prominent Americans, and created 
a climate sympathetic to economic assistance to Greece when 
Truman made such a request. The following chapters offer some 
insight on what Americans thought concerning British and Amer­
ican relations with Greece, and how they reacted to the an­
nounced Truman plan.
At the outset, a caveat is in order. It is hoped this 
paper will not be judged on ideological grounds. Certain 
necessary words invoke inescapable images for the twentieth 
century reader. Communism is such a word, but like democracy, 
in actual practice it may take many forms. A word or a polit­
ical system is not at issue here, but the ef forts of a people 
of one country to achieve representative government and the 
response of another people as they expressed their views to 
their President.
I am indebted to Philip D. Lagerquist and the archi­
vists of the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri 
whose kindness and professional acumen aided my studies in 
August 1974. Additional assistance was rendered in phone con­
versations and by correspondence with William E. Emerson, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Providing 
suggestions for research were Professors L. S. Stavrianos, 
Northwestern University; Melvin Small, Wayne State University 
and Monroe Billington, New Mexico State University, who promptly 
and kindly answered correspondence requesting their opinion 
on aspects of this study. I would also like to thank the mem­
bers of the Department of History, University of Nebraska at 
Omaha, especially Doctor William C. Pratt, as well as my hus­
band and family for their patience and encouragement.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTIONi REVELANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL 
MAIL AND POST WAR REALITIES
The President of the United States receives countless 
letters and telegrams each day concerning domestic and for­
eign policy. Communications concerning Greece and written 
to the White House from 1944 to 1947 are the subject of this 
paper.^ Greek internal politics and that country's relations 
with Britain and the United States dominated these messages 
as citizens wrote to express approval, disapproval or alter­
native policies. Therefore, a background summarizing Greek 
conditions and Anglo-American interests is included.
The volume of mail addressed to the President of the
United States has increased dramatically since the early years
of President Roosevelt's administration indicating a growing
literacy and awareness on the part of the American people.
This trend reflected President Roosevelt's penchant for in-
2viting the public's views. Available statistical evidence
*The manuscript sources for this paper are the Roose­
velt Papers (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New 
York) and the Truman Papers (Harry S. Truman Library, Inde­
pendence, Missouri.
2
Leila A. Sussmann, "FDR and the White House Mail," 
Public Opinion Quarterly. XX (Spring 1956), 5-6, 10.
1
2has been compiled to reflect this increase and proves that 
while the volume of mail leveled following the Roosevelt pres­
idency, it did not decline significantly. The following sta­
tistics also mark crisis periods during which White House mail 
peaked numerically.
annual correspondence "per 10,000 literate adults*
These figures are based on a ratio of
,.3
President Period Annual Ratio per
Lincoln Civil War 44 *
McKinley 1900 4 .7
Wilson World War I 47
Hoover Prior to 1929 11 .8
Roosevelt Midst of Depression 160
Roosevelt Late 1930's 111
Truman 1948 104
Eisenhower 1952 103
Two crisis periods were examined in this study: the Greek
Civil War which began December 3,1944, and ended in February 
1945, and the initial stage of the Truman Doctrine when it was 
introduced March 12, 1947, until it was implemented in May, 
1947.
Leila A. Sussmann, "Mass Political Letter Writing in 
America* The Growth of an Institution," Public Opinion Quar­
terly . XXIII (Summer 1959), 204; for a recent study based on 
White House mail,see Monroe Billington, "Civil Rights, Pres­
ident Truman and the South." The Journal of Negro History. 
LVIII (April 1973), 127-39.
3Only a small portion of White House mail is actually 
seen by the President. Concise reports are made of the con­
tents of incoming mail and sent to the Executive's secretary. 
Occasionally, individual letters are included. Letters are 
referred to the President when they represent a powerful in­
dividual or group, or when they indicate a genuine feeling for 
an event of interest to the President. The mail room staff 
is adept at recognizing pressure mail such as large batches 
of mail instigated by one organization. This mail is not 
granted the respect accorded individual’s correspondence, 
unless the group represented is politically powerful. After 
records are made of the contents, mail is carefully sorted
and sent to whatever executive department might best handle 
4the answer.
In comparing the results of polls and White House cor­
respondence it must be stressed that no generalization can be 
made on total correspondence received. Representative mes­
sages are retained, either in the original, or referred to by 
memorandum. Messages or petitions from organizations present 
an unknown numbers of concurring or dissenting individuals. 
Memoranda refer to 'several letters, or in the case of one memo 
during December, a petition with "thousands of signatures." 
Therefore, conclusions can be drawn only on an evaluation of
^Ira R. T. Smith and Joe Alex Morris, "Dear Mr. Pres­
ident" . . The Story of Fifty Years in the White House Mail 
Room (New York* Julian Messener Inc. , 194.9), pp. 4, 13-14, 
209-11; (Hereinafter cited as Smith, Dear Mr. President).
4type of mail retained, not overall totals, or totals of indi-
5
viduals represented.
Since 1943 the Department of State has maintained a 
separate desk to sort, tabulate, and respond to correspon­
dence concerning a foreign country. Correspondence, along 
with public opinion polls, and accounts of the news media are 
carefully compiled in statistical form to represent the pub­
lic opinion on developing policy toward an area.^ Evidence 
cannot support a proposition that public opinion influenced 
the development of United States foreign policy toward the 
Eastern Mediterranean. While there is some evidence that pub­
lic opinion imposes a limit to the extent of foreign policy, 
it only briefly limited legislative or executive policy toward
Smith, Dear Mr. President, pp. 187-91. Total cor­
respondence evaluated in this study is 247 documents which 
include letters, telegrams, memoranda and petitions. It 
should be noted that the significance to be attached to each 
item varies. Obviously, a memorandum summarizing a number of 
letters not retained or a telegram from an organization of 
interest group may have more significance than a communica­
tion from one individual.
^H. Schuyler Foster, "American Public Opinion and For­
eign Policy," The Department of State Bulletin. XLI (November 
30, 1959), 796-97? (Hereinafter cited as Foster, "Amer­
ican Public Opinion" ) j see Barnard C. Cohen, "The Relationship 
Between Public Opinion and the Foreign Policy Maker,” Public 
Opinion and Historians* Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. 
Melvin Small (Detroit* Wayne State University Press, 1970), 
pp. 70-79? (Hereinafter cited as Small, Public Opinion and 
Historians)? English historian A. V. Dicey found the American 
policy-making process in the nineteenth century uninfluenced 
by American public opinion, see A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the 
Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the 
Nineteenth Century (Londont MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1930),
pp. 7-9, 60-61.
5Greece.^
It is necessary to recognize that the effect of pub­
lic opinion on the policy-making process is difficult to mea­
sure. At the same time correspondence to a President repre­
sents only one segment of that opinion. Of what value then 
is White House mail? The correspondence considered for this 
paper reflects changing American attitudes during a period 
when American foreign policy took a radically divergent course
o
from any previous period in its history. One must assume
that those writing these letters were influenced by strong
9feeling, and were also to some extent informed. According to 
Gabriel A. Almond, only a small portion of the United States 
public was informed on foreign affairs following World War II. ^
Small discusses the limits imposed by public opinion 
in Melvin Small, "Historians Look at Public Opinion," Small, 
Public Opinion and Historians, p. 15; see also Foster, "Amer­
ican Public Opinion,.1’ The author contends public opinion im­
posed no limits on the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, ibid.. p. 798.
Q
Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Amer­
ican Foreign Policy: Formulation. Principles, and Programs
(Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1954), pp. 6 6 4 - / 0 1 ; (Hereinafter 
cited as Snyder, American Foreign Policy); see also Joseph 
Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (February 21 - June 5. 1947) 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. , 1955), pp. 187-88; 
(Hereinafter cited as Jones, Fifteen Weeks).
9
This writer read all retained correspondence con­
cerning Greece from the Roosevelt and Truman Libraries for the 
period October 1944 through 1952. These letters displayed a 
high degree of emotional, if not always intellectual, commit­
ment ,
^Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign 
Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1950) , p. 87 ; (Here- 
inafter cited as Almond, American People).
6If one accepts his conclusion, the letters initially con­
sidered here are atypical. A second consideration is that 
correspondence concerning Greece reflects a changing image of 
first Britain and later a more marked change in regard to 
Soviet-American relations.^
The origins of an image one people may. have of another
12country are intangible and difficult to measure. The Amer­
ican people were presented with the image of the Soviet Union
13and Britain as allies during World War II. These images
were easily changed by subsequent events. This change might
have been wrought by any of the following three arguments or
a combination of these forces. The acceptance of a wartime
ally was based on immediate need, not any permanent commit- 
14ment. The American public has commonly viewed foreigners 
with a distrust that on occasion may be easily aroused.^
^For a discussion of changing American attitudes re­
garding Britain and Russia, see Almond, American People, pp. 
96-97.
12Harold R. Issacs, "Sources for Images of Foreign 
Countries," Small, Public Opinion and Historians, pp. 91-105; 
see also Walter Uippmann., Public Opinion (2d ed. ; New York* 
The Free Press, 1949), pp. 3-20, 155-62.
13Melvin Small "How We Learned to Love the Russians * 
America Media and the Soviet Union During World War II," The 
Historian, XXXVI (May 1974), 455-78; (Hereinafter cited as 
Small, "HowWe Learned to Love the Russians); see also Almond, 
American People, p. 96.
^Almond. American People, pp. 87-99.
1 5Melvin Small, "Historians Look at Public Opinion," 
Small, Public Opinion and Historians, p. 22,
7Reinforced with the above two conditions the policy-maker
exercises tremendous influence simply by initiating pro- 
16posals. These factors must be considered in evaluating the 
changing mood of correspondence concerning Greece.
The news media are an additional impetus to opinion 
formation. Radio, as well as reports of columnists and news 
correspondents are included by the executive officials as in­
dicators of public opinion. These news stories are not con­
sidered representative of mass public opinion, but are a re­
flection of elite opinion. The State Department includes news 
stories as part of what constitutes the views of ordinary 
citizens. State Department tabulation of all known opinion 
suggests that the purpose is to influence public reaction to 
a previously desired course.^
Correspondents of Greek origin are evaluated separately 
where recognition is possible. Where sentiment toward Greece 
existed among Americans of other origins, it was generally 
romanticized. Greece was seen as the birthplace of democracy 
and a veritable museum of the antiquities of western civiliza-
Theodore J. Lowie, "Making Democracy Safe for the 
World: National Politics and Foreign Policy, ” Domestic Sources 
of Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free 
Press, 19671, pp. 315-23.
i 7
This course is suggested in Jones, Fifteen Weeks. 
pp. 174-76; see also Barnard C. Cohen, The Press* and Foreign 
Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1963), p. 133; Snyder, American Foreign Policy pp. 525-26.
81 o
tion, Rarely was it viewed in its modern context. The
Greek-American incorporated this sentiment, with that of the 
"Megali Idea” or the dream of a "Greater Greece, " This "Greater 
Greece" would include territories once incorporated in the 
Byzantine Empire. The "Megali Idea" of territorial achieve­
ment has had a tremendous emotional appeal to Greeks; those 
that immigrated to America kept its ideals before succeeding 
generations both by means of the Greek Orthodox Church and in 
such Greek schools as were established. As will be seen, the 
"Megali Idea" was probably the one belief capable of unifying
people of Greek Origin, and subjugated rational evaluation of
19the Greek national situation.
To avoid oversimplification it has been necessary to 
qualify the importance of public opinion and that portion of 
opinion represented here. This correspondence may only be 
safely taken as a reflection of changing American attitudes, 
while remembering that those attitudes were shaped by mul­
tiple forces. Some of these forces, such as news reports, 
executive initiative, and ethnic origins may be measured. 
Other impetus to opinion and its effect remain subjects of
^L. S, Stavrianos, "*fhe Best Damn Government Since 
Pericles,*" The Nation. 217 (October 22, 1973), 405-6.
19Recent events regarding Greek and Turkish attempts 
to control Cyprus demonstrates the appeal of the "Megali 
Idea;" tor historic evaluation see Theodore Saloutos, "The 
Greeks in the United States." The South Atlantic Quarterly. 
XLIV (January 1945), 73; (Hereinafter cited as Saloutos, 
"Greeks in the United States."
9speculation.
Presidential correspondence can only be understood 
against the background of political realities which opposed 
the avowed sentiment stated in the Atlantic Charter. As World 
War II came to a close Greece was a country torn by political 
factions. This reality would complicate the Greek people's 
attempt to determine their own form of government. Parlia­
mentary politicians excluded from government since the Metaxas 
dictatorship of 1936 were determined to exercise power in 
postwar Greece. The most influential of the prewar political 
parties were the Liberals and the Populists. Greece also had 
an active extreme left represented by the Greek Communist 
Party or the KKE. Driven underground by the Metaxas dictator­
ship, the KKE emerged in 1941 after the German occupation as 
the only organized Greek political group and joined with the 
Agrarian party to form the National Liberation Front or the 
EAM. The EAM and its military arm, the ELAS, had two stated 
aims: to drive the Nazis from Greece, and establish a govern­
ment representative of the Greek people. Unique in its na­
tional appeal, the EAM became a coalition of the Communist 
Party, the Agrarian Party, the Socialist Party, the Union of 
Popular Democracy, and the trade unions. The other two resis­
tance groups of any importance developed during the war years 
and were regional in character and based on the personal pop 
ularity of their leaders. They were the EDES, led by General
10
20Napoleon Zervas , and the EKKA, under Colonel Deraetrois Psarros .
Greece represented a classic example of Barrington
Moore's thesis of a people's attempt to achieve true demo-
21cratic government in the twentieth century. The Populists 
were completely reactionary and represented a ruling elite. 
Liberals represented the merchantilist and some intellec­
tual interests, and., by 1944 were engrossed in their own at­
tempts to create a political hegemony. A Liberal-Populist 
coalition formed when the two were threatened by the emerging
political power of the EAM. This coalition was determined to
22create an "authoritarian semi-parliamentary government."
The EAM failed to create representative government in Greece, 
because both Britain and the United States repressed nation­
alist aims in the years 1944 to 1949, with the acquiescence 
of a right wing government. Moore also contends a threat of 
foreign intervention serves to maintain a government semi-
To
L. S. Stavrianos, "The Greek National Liberation 
Front (EAM): A Study in Resistance Organization and Adminis­
tration," Journal of Modern History. XXIV (December 1952), 
42-43? see also "Greek Political Parties," The Economist. 
CXLVII (December 23, 1944), 837-38; Stephen G. Xydis, Greece 
and The Great Powers 1944-1947: Prelude to the "Truman Doc­
trine" (Thessoloniki. Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 
1963), p. 32; (Hereinafter cited as Xydis, Greece and The 
Great Powers.)
21 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 432-52, 438 fn. 4; (Herein- 
after cited as Moore, Social Origins).
22Quoted in ibid.. p. 438.
11
23democratic in form. That threat was represented in Greece 
by international communism. Churchill referred to the EAM/ELAS
as "Communist / s_Jt rebels" and "mutineers" in his speech
o /
before the House of Commons, December 8, 1944. His views
reflected the constant cry of the Greek right both during the
years of exile, and in Greece's postwar period. These views
25were eventually adopted by the United States.
Motivated by her interest in India, Britain as early
as 1815 determined to contain Russia and block that country's
2 6influence in the Mediterranean and Asia. In 1944 Britain 
retained her historic fear of Russian control of the Mediter­
ranean by way of the Turkish Straits. A British-controlled
23Moore, Social Origins, p. 439.
^Stfinston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph 
and Tragedy (6 Vols.; Boston* Houghton Mifflin Co.,1953), VI, 
293-95; (Hereinafter cited as Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy); 
for a text that takes the view that international Communism 
was suppressed in Greece, see Edgar O'Ballance, The Greek 
Civil Wart 1944-1949 (London* Faber and Faber, 19661, p^ 1~5* 
(Hereinafter cited as O'Ballance, Greek Civil War.
2 5L. S . Stavrianos, "Greece's Other History. " New York 
Review, XVI (July 17, 1971), 13; see also L. S. Stavrianos, 
Greece * American Dilemma and Opportunity (Chicago * Henry Reg- 
enery Co., 1952), pp. 113-15, 120, 122; (Hereinafter cited as 
Stavrianos, Greece* American Dilemma); Leland Stowe, Whi1 e 
Time Remains (New York* Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), pp. 4 3 2 4 4 -  
47"5 (Hereinafter cited as Stowe, While Time Remains).
26 G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question* 
Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London* University of London Press, 
Ltd".", 1971), pp. 33-35, 244; see also J. A. R. Marriott,' The 
Eastern Question* An Historical Study in European Diplomacy 
(3d ed., rev; Oxford* Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 209, 218- 
19.
12
India was still a reality, and the Suez route to India was
27paramount to British interests. Equally important, Middle
Eastern oil was a necessity to British industry and for the
maintenance of the British Navy. The English historian, John
Strachey, calls this "The Empire of Oil,'" and considers it
Britain's last and most financially successful acquisition.
It consisted of areas in Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Jordan
which came under British control at the end of World War I.
28British influence in Iran preceded these gains. Bordering
the Mediterranean Sea, Greece became crucial as a result of
the proximity of that country to the Turkish Straits and the
Middle East. Britain's historic interests in India and the
modern need for Middle Eastern oil intensified her desire to
contain Russia in the twentieth century, and provided the
29impetus to involvement in Greece.
On October 9, 1944, Churchill and Stalin agreed to a 
temporary division of the Balkans. By this agreement, Britain 
was allowed a free hand in Greece. Churchill's expressed fear
27
John Howes Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in 
Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opinion 
(Cambridge» Harvard University Press, 1950)^ pp. 62-64, /l-^6, 
268-69.
o o
John Strachey, The End of Empire (New York: Random 
House, 1959), pp. 154-55; Strachey suggests the Soviet Union 
and the United States inherited the British Empire, see ibid. , 
pp. 2 7 7, 2 93.
29Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 26-28; Xydis 
makes clear the Greek government in exile 01941-1944) realized 
its country's geographic importance to British interests.
13
was that Soviet troops would come to dominate all Eastern
Europe upon liberation of that area. Thus an Anglo-Soviet
agreement was initially made at Churchill’s request. Brit-
ian's actions in Greece during Decemnber 1944, offered Stalin
31a pretext for his country's subsequent Balkan policy. While 
the Soviet Union cannot be absolved from violating the prin­
ciple of self-determination for- nations, initial Balkan inter­
vention was British-instigated, and created a postwar Anglo- 
Soviet spheres of influence policy which inaugurated postwar 
unilateral action. Franklin Roosevelt acquiesced when Royal
Hellenic and British troops imposed a British dominated gov-
32ernment in Greece in December 1944. A number of factors
motivated the acquiescence. They include his desire to maintain 
friendly terms with Britain and his determination to pro­
tect the United states from Balkan involvement. Perhaps
30Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy t pp. 226-27; Herbert 
Feis, Churchill Rossevelt Stalin: The War They Waged and the 
Peace They Sought (Princeton, New Jerseys Princeton University 
Press, 1957), pp. 339-40; (Hereinafter cited as P'eis, Churchill 
Roosevelt Stalin.)
31 Churchill acknowledged that he could not condemn 
Soviet intervention in Rumania and Bulgaria because the Soviet 
Union had allowed him a free hand in Greece by the Anglo-Soviet 
Agreement of October 9, 1944, see Churchill, Triumph and Trag­
edy p. 420.
32 . . .The Greek government supported by Britain in the
Civil War of December, 1944, was British-instigated in May, 
1944, see William Hardy McNeill, American, Britain and Russia» 
Their Cooperation and Conflict 1941-46 (London: Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, 1953), p"i 422.
14
33even his lack of physical vigor should be considered. Roose­
velt allowed Greece's future to be decided long before the 
Yalta Conference met in February 1945 to consider among other
r\§
topics the status of small nations.
Between the liberation of Greece and the passage of
the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, the United States almost completely
revised its foreign policy. In 1944 the principles of the
Atlantic Charter, agreed to by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill in 1941, proclaiming belief in the self-determination
of liberated nations were accepted by many Americans. These
Americans hoped an effective world organization would become 
35a reality. Following World War II, the Atlantic Charter
principles and a strong United Nations were shattered within
three years, as officials of the United States came to believe
in the necessity for unilateral action. Joseph Jones, writing
of the events leading to United States intervention in Greece,
stated: "what we had thought were British chestnuts were in 
3 6fact our own." World War II made the necessity for a con-
33Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins : An Inti­
mate History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p~, 838. 
841 -42 ; (Hereinafter cited as Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins): 
see also "FDR’s Conspiracy of Silence." Time^ 104 (September 
16, 1974), 22-23.
o /
Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 64-73.
3 5Snyder, American Foreign Policy. pp. 51-52, 789,
793-94.
3 Quoted in Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 188.
15
stant source of petroleum a reality to the American govern­
ment. According to government studies based on domestic indus­
trial and general public consumption, known oil reserves were 
considered inadequate to maintain a large Navy or provide 
adequate petroleum in case of war. By the wars end, reserves 
were expected to last less than two decades. As early as 
February 5, 1944, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes 
maintained that the United States would necessarily have to 
develop an active naval interest in the Mediterranean in order
to protect access to the termination point of Middle East pipe 
38lines. James Forrestal as Secretary of the Navy, and later
39as Secretary of Defense, concurred with this view. Through­
out 1946, the United States naval presence in the Mediterranean 
increased, until by September 1946 a permanent Mediterranean
fleet became a reality. This naval growth was to protect oil
40supplies and the United States European interests. The
„
Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers. p. 578, fn. 24; 
Halford L. Hoskins, Middle East Oil in United States Foreign 
Policy. Public Affairs Builetin No. 89 ^Washington, D. C.* 
The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, Dec­
ember 1950;, p. 36; (Hereinafter cited as Hoskins, Middle East 
Oil.
3 8Ickes as quoted in Hoskins. Middle East Oil, p. 94.
8 QIbid.. p. 36, fn. 41; see also Walter Millis, ed., 
The Forrestal Diaries (New York* The Viking Press, 1951), 
p. 357; (Hereinafter cited as Millis, Forrestal Diaries).
40Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers. p. 159; see also 
Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 144, 1?1, T57, 211.
16
Trans-Arabian oil line proposed in 1946 further intensified 
United States interest in the Mid-East and Mediterranean, 
which dated from the first United States oil company conces­
sions in 1927.^
Postwar. Soviet activities concerning control of the 
Turkish Straits further increased United States interests.
The United States felt reasonably safe as long as the British 
navy dominated the Mediterranean Sea, but as Britain's post­
war power waned, off icials found control of the Mediterranean 
crucial. British "chestnuts" had indeed become those of the 
United States. American policy became that of Britain; to 
contain the Soviet Union and develop a naval hegemony in the 
Mediterranean. Friendly governments in Greece and Turkey were 
crucial to this interest, but partially as a result, Soviet- 
American relations polarized leading to cold war.
Truman's memoirs indicate sympathy for the small 
nations of Europe. Both he and his close advisor, Chief of 
Staff Admiral William D. Leahy, felt Soviet intransigence at 
the 1945 Potsdam Conference initiated cold war conflict, and 
made United States protection of small nations such as Greece 
and Turkey inevitable. Their chief criticism of Stalin at
^Hoskins, Middle East Oil, pp. 76, 94.
/ 0
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Vol 
Two; Years of Trial and Hope (2 Vpls.; Garden City, New York; 
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), IIj 96-97, 99-100; (Herein­
after cited as Truman, Years of Trial); see also D. F. Fleming 
The Cold War and Its Origins : 1917-1960 (London; George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd. , 1961,) pp. '440-42
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that time was based on his nation's activities in Poland,
43Rumania and Bulgaria. In both Rumania and Bulgaria, Stalin 
was exercising authority granted the Soviet Union by the Anglo - 
Soviet agreement of October 1944. Sentiment clouded the real­
ities of the internal Greek political situation, as it equally 
clouded the pragmatics of British and United States involve­
ment in Greece.
Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William 
Morrow and Co., Inc., 1973), p. 343; (Hereinafter cited as 
Truman, Harry S. Truman); see also William D. Leahy, I Was 
There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents 
Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at 
the Time, forward by President Truman (New York: Whittlesey 
House McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1950), pp. 428-29; Truman, 
Years of Trial, p. 106; Robert G. Kaiser, Cold Winter. Cold 
War (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1974), p~, 11; (Here- 
inafter cited as Kaiser, Cold Winter); American revisionist 
historians take an opposing view, see Small, "How We Learned 
to Love the RussiansProfessor Small identif ies the leading 
revisionist historians asWilliamA. Williams, Gar Alperovitz, 
Gabriel Kolko, Walter LaFaber, Lloyd Gardner, and Barton J. 
Bernstein in ibid.. p. 455, fn. 1.
CHAPTER II
AMERICAN REACTION 
TO BRITISH INTERVENTION IN GREECE
Press reports of Allied troops firing on Greek civil­
ians astonished Americans in December of 1944. Greece was a 
popular wartime ally, but events rooted in the Greek political 
past and a British effort to create a sympathetic government 
in the Mediterranean coincided to create a dismaying situa­
tion. Because of wartime censorship, few Americans were 
aware of relations between the exiled Greek government and 
Great Britain, but news accounts favorable to the resistance 
fighters in Greece were common. In the coming confrontation 
between the chief resistance group, theEAM,and British sup­
ported royalist Greek forces, Americans favored the EAM, as 
evidenced in correspondence to President Roosevelt.^
Expressing exceptional knowledge of the British, the Royal 
Hellenic and the EAM triangle, Basil J. Vlavianos, publisher 
and editor of The National Herald, a Greek newspaper located 
in New York City, wrote Roosevelt that he feared an "unpopular 
government" would be imposed on the Greek people by the "fas­
cist methods" of those unable to retain political power.
^All unpublished manuscripts in this chapter are from 
Roosevelt Papers (The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park,
New York); (Hereinafter cited by description, date and file 
number only).
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Vlavianos asked for a def initive American policy which objected
to any British-imposed political system, and also requested
that the true background of British actions respecting Greece 
2
be published.
The National Herald and its editor were considered of 
sufficient importance to warrant a Presidential reply. Dem­
ocratic National Committee member Charles Olson requested a 
Presidential Statement for publication in The National Herald. 
In referring to that paper he states: "his paper represents
the liberal group . . . and carries the majority of Greek
3
Americans with it." President Roosevelt wrote Mr. Vlavianos
for publication:
It is the further desire of our government that the Greek 
people who have fought so valiantly for democratic ideals 
will be able to exercise, as soon as possible, the right 
of all democratic people and choose freely for themselves 
the form of government under which they will live. 4
Roosevelt's phrase that the Greek people should be able to
choose their own government "as soon as possible," had little
2
Letter, Basil J. Vlavianos to Roosevelt, OF 4675-Z, 
October 14, 1944.
3
Quoted from memorandum to James Barnes from Charles 
Olson, PPF 772, October 17, 1944. It should be noted that both 
ethnic groups and organized labor are considered to have more 
influence on the policy-making process than their numerical 
numbers might warrant, see Bernard C. Cohen, The Influence of 
Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy Making, forward by 
Max F. Millikan (World Peace Foundation, Center of Interna­
tional Studies: Princeton University, 1959), II, 6-8,
^Quoted from letter, Roosevelt to BasilJ . Vlavianos, 
PPF 772, October 19, 1944.
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relation to British wartime policies or the impending political 
crisis.
A crisis developed because Winston Churchill was 
determined to return King George II to the Greek throne, which 
was apparently contrary to the wishes of a majority of the Greek 
people who viewed with suspicion the King's past actions. 
George II, fearing the demands of an emerging democratic move­
ment within Greece, had allowed John Metaxas to assume dicta­
torial powers in 1936. Under the Metaxas dictatorship there 
was no meeting of Parliament, civil liberties were curtailed, 
and dissenters were imprisoned or exiled. Public works were 
introduced similar to those instigated in Nazi Germany, but the 
fascist-oriented regime was unpopular with the Greek people. 
Italy invaded Greece in October of 1940. Violent Greek resis­
tance collapsed with the subsequent invasion by German forces 
in April 1941. Metaxas died in January 1941. The newly formed 
government fleeing the Nazi invasion was accompanied by a King 
formally associated with an unpopular dictatorship.^
Howard K. Smith, The State of Europe (New York* Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1949), p. 232; (Hereinafter cited as Smith, State of 
Europe); for a study reflecting official British opinion see 
Sir Llewellyn Woodward. British Foreign Policy in the Second 
World War (London* Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971), 
383-439; (Hereinafter cited as Woodward, British Foreign Policy. )
^Edward S. Forster, A Short History of Modern Greece» 
1821-1956. rev. and enl. by Douglas Dakin (3d ed.; New York* 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 190, 196-97, 214; see also 
L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York* Holt, Rine­
hart and Wins ton, 1958 ) 7 pp"! 670-76.
21
A proposed American visit by George II in 1942 illus­
trates that Roosevelt felt Greek-Americans disliked the Greek 
King. In a memorandum to acting Secretary of State, Sumner 
Welles , which in turn would be presented to the Greek Minister, 
Roosevelt advised that George II should dress as Commander-in- 
Chief of the Greek Army and avoid the appearance of a head of 
state by wearing a plain army uniform. Because of its resis­
tance to Mussolini and Hitler, the Greek Army was popular in
7
the United States. Roosevelt believed that George II was not.
The Royal Hellenic government spent the war years in 
exile in Cairo, Egypt, while George II divided his time between 
Egypt and London. Meanwhile in Greece, the EAM which had be­
come a strong nationalistic movement spent the war years in
8active resistance against the Nazis. In 1944, the United 
States Ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, described the 
EAM as a coalition of Greek forces which opposed the King's
9
return. An Office of Strategic Services report made soon
Elliott Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters. 1928- 
1945. forward by Eleanor Roosevelt (New York: Duell, Sloan and 
Pearce, 1950), II, 1308.
8Churchill admitted the effectiveness of the guerrilla 
resistance in July 1943; see Winston S. Churchill, The Second 
World War : Closing The Ring (6 Vols.; Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 
Co., 1951), V, 464; (Hereinafter cited as Churchill, Closing; 
The Ring); see also L. S. Stavrianos. Greece: American Dilemma, 
pp. 65, 92-93.
q .
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States (1944), Vol. V, "The Near East, South 
Asia, and Africa; The Far East," Pubn. 7859 (1965), p. 145; 
(Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1944), V).
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after liberation recognized the EAM as a purely nationalistic 
movement.*^ Yet, Churchill maintained that a Communist con­
trolled EAM would seize power in Greece.** To the contrary, 
there is documentary evidence to prove that the EAM, which had 
welcomed the British landing, was dismayed when open warfare 
broke out. Records of the KKE Central Committee were obtained
by British Intelligence in Athens in December 1944, and prove
12the EAM had no plan for armed revolution.
British determination to establish a right wing gov­
ernment in Greece predated liberation by at least a year, In 
the fall of 1943, a New Zealander, Captain Donald Scott of the 
British Armed Forces, made contact with the German authorities 
in Athens. His exact orders are unknown but his mission was 
an apparent attempt to enlist German support in establishing
an anti-left wing government in Athens in the event of German 
13withdrawl.
■ ■■ .j ■■ w
John 0. Iatrides, Revolt in Athens * The Greek Com­
munist "Second Round.M 1944^1945 (Princeton, New Jersey * 
Princeton University Press, 1972), App. F. 324-19; (Herein­
after cited as Iatrides. Revolt in Athens).
**Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 287.
12 Iatrides, Revolt in Athens. pp. 149-51; the originals 
of these records are on file at the British Embassy, Athens, 
see ibid.. p. 151, fn. 27; see also George D. Kousoulas, Rev­
olution and Defeat* The Story of the Greek Communist Party 
(London* Oxford University Press, 1965); Kousoulas * thesis is 
that the EAM was the tool of the KKE, and was determined to 
establish a Communist dictatorship by revolution; he admits 
the lack of documentary evidence to support his contentions, 
see Ibid.. p. 201.
1 3
Iatrides, Revolt In Athens, pp. 41-43.
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In April 1944, the armed forces stationed with the 
Greek government in exile in Cairo, Egypt, demanded a more dem­
ocratic government by asking that the resistance forces within 
Greece be represented in the government in exile. The British 
troops ruthlessly suppressed what they considered a "mutiny.”
An estimated 15,000 soldiers and sailors involved were still 
imprisoned in the fall of 1945. Due to rigid British censor­
ship the "Gario Mutiny ” was not publicized in either the United 
States or Britain. Cario troops were hand-picked for royalist
sympathies and from this group the Greek Mountain Brigade was 
14formed. The loyalist Mountain Brigade was assigned to Athens
by British order and arrived November 8, 1944. The Mountain
Brigade's presence was to be the primary cause of the outbreak
1 5of the Greek Civil War the following December.
In the beginning of May 1944, the first overtures for 
a spheres of influence policy in the Balkans were made by the 
British Ambassador to Moscow who approached the Soviet author­
ities with the suggestion that Britain be given a free hand in 
Greece. In exchange the Soviet Union could direct the affairs 
of Rumania. The Soviet government would agree only if the 
United States would approve. When informed of the British
^Stowe, While Time Remains, pp. 248-49, 264; see also 
National Liberation Front (EAM) White Book: May. 1944 - March 
194 5 (New York: Greek American Council, 1945), p. 17; (Here- 
inafter cited as EAM White Book).
^ EAM White Book, pp. 17, 22-26.
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plan, United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull rejected 
it as a spheres of influence policy in the Balkans.^ Chur­
chill finally won Roosevelt's approval for a trial period to 
last three months, not to exceed the war period, and informed 
the Soviet Union of this acquiescence.^ To insure his posi­
tion, Churchill requested a conference with Stalin to be held 
in October 1944. Arriving in Moscow on October 9, Churchill 
sealed Greece's future political structure that same evening. 
In reference to the Balkans he said to Stalin* "Don't let us 
get at cross purposes in small ways," and of fered Soviet dom­
ination in Rumania in exchange for Greece. Stalin immediately 
agreed, but Churchill's reply indicates his moral qualifica­
tions to what had been decided*
At length I said, "Might it not be thought rather cynical 
if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful 
to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let 
us burn the paper." "No, you keep it," said Stalin. 18
Churchill reported that the United States Ambassador 
to Moscow, Averell Harriman, was present at this meeting. He 
was not, nor did he have a clear understanding of the agree-
1
Basil Collier, The Lion and The Eagle* British and 
Anglo-American Strategy. 1900-1950 (New York* G. Putnam's 
Sons, 1972j , p”! 353? see also Churchill, Closing The Ring, p. 
708; Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, pp. 339-40.
^Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Staiin. pp. 341-43.
1 o
Quoted from Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp.
227-28.
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19ment. An official communique to Roosevelt, October 10, made
scant reference to the Balkans merely stating* "We have to
consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the
20Balkan countries, including Hungary and Turkey. The Anglo-
Russian arrangement was not known to the EAM, nor is it clear
21at what point the Royal Hellenic government was informed.
Prior to liberation, delegates from the resistance 
forces within Greece met in Lebanon with representatives of 
the exiled Greek government. George Papandreou, who was se­
lected conference chairman by the British, and the British 
Ambassador Sir Reginald Leeper dominated the meeting. All 
twenty-eight delegates signed the Lebanon Agreement which 
provided for a coalition government of right and left. Yet, 
Papandreou had no intention of adhering to the Lebanon agree­
ment, which included EAM representation in the government.
1 9Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, p. 448, fn. 7; 
for Harriman's report of the Moscow Conference, see U. S . 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 
(1944), Vol. IV, "Europe," Pubn. 8067 (1966), pp. 1009-1010; 
(Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1944), IV).
20Stalin1s Correspondence With Churchill. Attlee. 
Roosevelt and Truman 1941-1945 (New York* EL P. Dutton and 
Co., Inc., 1958). There is no reference in this volume to the 
Anglo-Soviet percentage agreement of October 9, 1944.
21Dominique Eudes, The Kapetanios* Partisan and Civil 
War In Greece. 1934-1949. trans. by John Howe (New York and 
London* Monthly Review Press, 1972;, p. 167; (Hereinafter 
cited as Eudes, Kapetanios); see also Xydis, Greece and The 
Great Powers. As the most, exhaustive study of relations be­
tween the Royal Hellenic government and Great Britain, this 
study does not mention when the Greek government was informed 
of the Anglo-Soviet agreement. Xydis remarks that Churchill 
armed with this agreement was in a position to suppress re­
volt, see j bid.. p. 62.
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During the Lebanon Conference he asked the EDES delegate if
his forces could destroy the EAM; if not, Papandreou implied
22
that the British would. These were the political realities
that preceded Greek liberation.
In October 1944, as German forces withdrew from
Greece, British troops landed to guarantee the survival of a
British formed Greek government under the leadership of Papan- 
23dreou. Unsure of British intentions, the EAM which con-
24trolled Athens, welcomed the British landing. A young Amer­
ican lieutenant witnessed the Greek liberation and his letter 
describing events was sent by his mother to Roosevelt. This 
message provides a vivid description of the economic and 
political situation*
Try to imagine Cincinnati with no lights, gas, or water, 
or no telephone or street cars, nine out of ten shops 
closed and empty - and the dollar bill worth about three 
for a penny. In addition - all railroads, shipping, and 
factories at a standstill and - almost full unemploy­
ment. . . .
In reference to the political situation, the "right" referred 
to is the government of George Papandreou and the "left" is 
the EAM*
the "left" has a definite economic and social program,
_
Iatrides, Revolt in Athens. pp. 63-64; Xydis, Greece 
and The Great Powers, p. 56; Eudes, Kapetanios. pp. 130-37; 
for MacVeagh's report on British direction of the Conference 
see FRUS (1944), V, 106-7.
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 283-85.
0 /
Eudes, Kapetanios. pp. 171-73.
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the only program of the "right" is to attack the "left" 
and bemoan any possible material sacrifice. . . . The 
tragedy is that the local Communist program is slightly 
less radical than the New Deal, but the damned fools 
call themselves "Communists". . . .  25
As reported by American news correspondents such as 
Leland Stowe, George Weller, and Richard Mowrer, the EAM co­
operated with the British from liberation to December 3. Stowe 
reported that the EAM welcomed the British and removed its
armed forces from the Athens area at British Commander General
26Ronald Scobies's request. George Weller traveled through­
out central Greece and the Peloponnesos in November and inter­
viewed British military commanders in a majority of major 
cities. Every commander praised the EAM for its aid in the 
administration of the countryside. At the same time, George 
Weller also reported fascists and f ormer German collaborators
remained at large in Athens, and were incorporated in the
27Royal Hellenic army. Richard Mowrer wrote of his disgust 
for the rich of Athens, describing constant parties which were 
held in the Psyhico and Kolonaki sections of the city. Mowrer 
attended one of these gatherings and reported the people and
Quote from memorandum to Grace Tully, OF 4847, Jan­
uary 11, 1945. The attached letter is dated October 26, 1944 
and describes the preceding two weeks in Greece.
2 6Stowe, While Time Remains, pp. 250-51. Panos Morpho- 
poulos reported EAM/ELAS was peaceful and cooperating with 
the British, see "Greece The Struggle For Power." The New Re­
public . Ill (November 6, 1944), p. 590.
27Chicago Daily News. November 9, 1944, p. 2\ November 
24, 1944, p . 2; Nov ember 2 7, 1944, p. 2.
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the areas were untouched by war. Yet these same people com­
plained heatedly of their hardships and the threat of Com­
munism.. Mowrer believed that 85 percent of the Greek people
2 8supported the EAM. Mowrer also commented on the activities
of extreme right wing groups called X-itesf which operated
under the leadership of Colonel George Grivas, and were made
up of former Nazi collaborators and ardent monarchists. The
X-ites operated freely in Athens from the time of the British 
29landing.
Howard K. Smith, in writing of these events between 
October 4 and December 3, 1944, stated : "One is forced to con­
clude that the British were determined to break EAM and install
in power the discredited monarchy and its blindly vengeful
30rightist supporters." The following sequence of events sup­
ports Smith's contention. On November 8, 1944, Churchill
advised his military commander in the Mediterranean to rein-
31force Athens, as a Communist take-over was imminent. On
that same day, the royalist Mountain Brigade arrived in Athens . 
On December 1, Scobie ordered that the EAM be immediately dis­
armed. This order was refused by the EAM unless the Mountain
, ,
Chicago Daily News. October 30, 1944, p. 4.
^ I b i d . . November 4, 1944, p. 2.
3 0Smith, State of Europe, p. 232.
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 287.
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Brigade was also demobilized, Greek Premier Papandreou orig­
inally agreed, but then withdrew this agreement under British 
direction. As a result, the EAM Cabinet Ministers resigned
in protest to British intervention in the internal af fairs of 
32Greece. This resignation precipated a government crisis, 
but not a civil war as the EAM continued to act within the 
law. On December 1, the EAM announced it would disband when 
the Mountain Brigade was demobilized. This announcement also 
asked why former German collaborators were not brought to 
trial, and expressed the fear that George II would be restored 
to the throne by the Greek right,, Following the announcement, 
the EAM asked for and was granted a civil permit for a peace­
ful demonstration to be held Sunday, December 3, in Syntagma
33Square, Athens.
An abundance of historical data proves the EAM did 
not start the actual fighting on December 3, at the Syntagma 
demonstration. Roosevelt's correspondence files contain as 
accurate and poignant an account as can be found in this eye­
witness report sent to the White Houses
The main square was covered with police armed with tommy 
guns and a few British armored cars strategically placed.
T7EAM White Book, pp. 34, 36-37 j see also Stowe. While 
Time Remains, pT 249.
.3.3EAM White Book, p. 37, 41. The permit to demon­
strate was withdrawn by Papandreou, under orders from British 
General Ronald M. Scobie late on December 2, too late for the 
Athens people to be told* see also Stowe, While Time Remains.
p. 252.
30
Promptly at 11, the parade appeared several thousand 
strong, unarmed. and led by women and children carrying 
United Nations flags crying "freedom and Democracy," It 
was perfectly orderly. The police tried to hold them 
back at first with fists and rifle butts, but they broke 
thru and reformed the parade. I was sure that trouble 
had been averted when - suddenly - evidently by prear­
ranged signal - the police dropped back in a line and 
opened fire. The crowd went down like a pack of cards. 
As soon as they started to get up, the police fired 
again. Finally the foremost of the crowd managed to 
crawl into a sunken garden, - that is, all but about 
fif teen, - chiefly women and kids under f if teen who didn't 
get up - and the flags lay in the gutter, .
A few minutes later British tanks appeared and ma­
neuvered in such a way as to protect - police quarters! 
I was almost actively sick - at what I'd seen and the 
implications of what was to come I can't - so won't go 
into the whole story, but it's the first instance I know 
of a counter revolution being started when there was no 
revolution to counter. 34
In addressing Parliament, Churchill described the 
beginning of the Greek Civil War as "a well-organized plot by 
which ELAS should march down to Athens and seize it by armed
:3S
force and establish a reign of terror." John Menard, of 
Detroit, Michigan disagreed with Churchill's views, and his 
letter placed a different interpretation on British actions
Q /
Memorandum to Grace Tully, OF 4847, attached letter 
dated January 11, 1945. For other accounts on the outbreak 
of the Civil War, see EAM White Book, p. 41; FR-US (1944), V, 
148; Stowe, While Time Remains, p. 253-54. Dimitri Kessel of 
Life took pictures proving unarmed men, women and children 
were fired upon, see "Civil War Breaks Out in Greece," Life. 
Vol. 17 (December 25, 1944), 20-23; see also Stavrianos, 
Greece: American Dilemma. The author quotes the eyewitness 
report of the December 3 events as reported by British officer, 
A. Byford Jones. Jones witnessed an unarmed crowd being fired 
upon point blank. The fire was not returned, see ibid., pp. 
131-32.
35Winston Churchill as quoted in Stowe, While Time 
Remains. p. 250.
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in Greece*
Some of those my neighbors brought me the news paper 
this morning dealing with Mr. Churchill, his bankers mixed 
up with the Greek government and the same banks are the 
main cause for the shooting of our faithful allies in 
Greece who for FOUR LONG YEARS fought Hitler's armies 
and when they had them annihilated then Churchill sends 
his army there to tell the Greek people who he wants for 
their leader and who for their king. . . .  36
The British and Royal Hellenic armies were unable to 
achieve military victory. The savage street fighting provoked 
on December 3 continued for thirty-three days. Heavy artil­
lery ,mor tars, and planes were employed which almost demolished
37the poorer sections of Athens. While the British enjoyed
strategic superiority in their control of the Athens Airport,
and the port of Piraeus, they encountered great difficulty
keeping the roads open into the center of the city, where their
control was never more than a few blocks surrounding the Hotel
Grand Bretagne, including Syntagma Square, and the nearby
38British Embassy. General Scobie's forces were British,
39Indian, and Royalist Greek Troops. In addition, known Nazi
1 ftLetter, John Menard to Roosevelt, OF 206-A, December
13, 1944.
^ EAM White Book, pp. 68-69.
^^FRUS (1944), V, 146; see also Harold Macmillian, 
The Blast of War 1939-1945 (New York: Harper and Row, Pub- 
lishers, 1967), pi 5057
o Q
Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, p. 176, fn. 68, gives 
the forces as of December 3 * Greek 13,000; British 13,000; 
ELAS 50,000. ELAS reported its forces were 70,000, EAM White 
Book, p. 55; this figure is supported by Smith, State of 
Europe. p. 229.
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collaborators were allowed to fight with the Royal Hellenic
40Army against the EAM. The British originally planned to
utilize 10,000 men in Athens. But it became necessary to 
bring additional troops from the Italian front until by the 
end of December the British forces had grown to 60,000 men 
with another 18,000 on standby.^ Yet, at the War's end the 
EAM remained in control of the majority of the Greek mainland 
and Greek Islands.^
During the war, private American citizens, labor groups , 
and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People joined in writing and wiring Roosevelt expressing dis­
may that accepted principles for the postwar world could so 
easily be crushed. These messages contained a recurring theme, 
that of support for a future United Nations. The International 
Woodworkers of America wired Roosevelt*
It is evident that Great Britain has erred from the 
path charted in the Atlantic Charter, which in article 
No. 3 states; "They respect the right of all people to 
choose the form of government under which they will live; 
and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government 
restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of 
them." . . . We urge that immediate action be taken to 
alleviate the critical situation that is now in Greece 
before reactionary elements in this country and Britain
^Smith, State of Europe, p. 233; see also O'Ballance, 
Greek Civil War, pp. 93-94.
^Woodward, British Foreign Policy, pp. 421-23; see 
also Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, p. 541, fn. 58.
/ o
Smith, State of Europe, p. 231.
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use it for the purpose of dividing the United Nations. 43 
Americans protested British treatment of the EAM as 
well. Telegrams, and letters referred tix the resistance group 
as war heroes and questioned the failure of the American gov­
ernment in coming to the aid of the former resistance f ighters, 
A California chapter of the NAACP reminded the President that 
the war was against fascism, not an allied people:
It is a well established fact the ELAS in Greece rep­
resents, the coalition of democratic forces which drove 
the Nazis out of Greece. All freedom loving people de­
plore the unfortunate policy of the British government 
in Greece. . . .  We protest the use of American made 
instruments of war against the Greek people. We urge 
President Roosevelt to use the influence of the United 
States to put an end to the unnecessary conflict in 
Greece. . . .  44
In answer to those requesting Roosevelt's support in
ending the Greek Civil War was a stated policy of United States
neutrality. Secretary of State E. R. Stettinius declared on
December 5 that the United States policy was non-interference
in the internal affairs of liberated countries. He added:
"The American people have naturally viewed with sympathy the
aspirations of the resistance movements and the anti-Fascist
45elements in liberated countries." This statement was re-
/ Q
Memorandum to StettinLus, OF 206-A, December 14, 
1944; attached telegram from International Woodworkers of 
America, Everett, Washington; memorandum to The State Depart­
ment, Blake to Hughes, OF 206-A, December 13, 1944.
^Quoted Fr-om memorandum to Daniels, OF 93, January 
10, 1945, with attached telegram from California NAACP.
45Quoted from FRUS (1944), V, 148
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leased to the Voice of America to be broadcast throughout 
46Europe. This announcement invoked a heated response from
Churchill, and resulted in the first split in Allied rela-
tions. In a conciliatory letter to Prime Minister Churchill
on December 13,1944, Roosevelt recommended that a regency be
created until such time as a plebiscite could be held and he
suggested demobilizing the Mountain Brigade as well as the
48resistance forces. Despite the practicality of the Presi­
dent's advice, many would die before Churchill heeded it.
Both Br itish and American news commentators were pres­
ent in Athens during the period. Their reports affected pub­
lic opinion in both countries. Edward P. Morgan reported from 
London that both The Times and Manchester Guardian opposed 
Churchill's policies. A summary of British press opinion car­
ried in the Chicago Daily News December 7, was unanimously 
critical. The Times said the government had created a "disas­
trous predicament" that would draw criticism from across 
Europe. The Manchester Guardian called for an end to inter­
ference in the affairs of liberated countries. The Daily 
Herald asked that the Greek people be allowed to choose their 
own government. The News Chronicle called for an end to sup-
46FRUS (1944), V, 148.
/ ~7
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 836-37.
48Roosevelt to Churchill as quoted in Churchill, 
Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 299-301.
35
49porting a monarch with arms. George Weller represented
the Chicago Daily News in Athens and his articles accused the
British of doing more damage to the city than the Germans did
during their occupation. He charged the British and the
British-supported Greek government were making war, with Amer-
50ican made lend-lease weapons, on women and children. One 
of Weller's reports concerned United Nations Relief and Reha­
bilitation Administration packages which were 70 percent Amer­
ican supplied. Weller charged that General Scobie would not 
allow food distribution to a starving population. The sup­
plies were stacked in Piraeus's warehouses to be sold by the
51Greek right on the black market. Richard Mowrer's reports
were also carried in the Chicago Daily News. He accused the
British of fighting alongside former Nazi collaborators and
52Metaxas regime fascists to defeat the Greek people. A Stars 
and Stripes editorial claimed Britain showed more preoccupa­
tion with insuring a route to India than defeating the Ger- 
53mans. One reference to a report supporting Churchill's
^Chicago Daily News. December 7, 1944, p. 2; Dec­
ember 14, 1944, p. 2 j December 22, 1944, p. 6.
~^Ibid.. December 15, 1944, p. 2; December 30, 1944, 
p. 1; December 22, 1944, p. 4.
~^Ibid.. December 23, 1944, p. 1, 2; December 26,
1944, p . 5.
~^Ibid.. December 21, 1944, p. 3.
~^Ibid., December 19, 1944, p. 2.
36
policies was found in the conservative Chicago Daily News from 
October 1944 through the spring of 1945. Emphasizing her 
objections to British policies, Dorothy Thompson noted in her 
column on December 11 that Herman Goebbels, in a German radio 
broadcast, had supported the British effort. Goebbels called 
for joint British-German action to defeat European Communism.
Greek-American Societies registered protest to the 
reported events. The largest and most influential, the Amer­
ican Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), 
with an estimated membership of fifty thousand issued a press 
statement on December 5 calling British intervention, "the 
application of imperialistic and power politics." This an­
nouncement continued: "Only an aroused American public opinion 
can force Colonel Blimps and other imperialists of Great
55Britain to discontinue . . . this blatant rape of Greece."
In the midst of a deteriorating military situation, 
Churchill and Anthony Eden visited Athens on December 15, 
1944. At last the British Prime Minister agreed to the estab­
lishment of a regency under the leadership of the Archbishop 
of Athens, Damaskinos, and returned to London to convince 
George II to agree to this arrangement. This regency provided
•^Chicago Daily News. December 11, 1944, p. 6.
55Press release, statement of George C. Vournas, OF 
206-A, December 5, 1944. For information on Greek American 
Societies see Saloutos, "The Greeks in the United States," 
pp. 79-80. Saloutos estimated that there were 500,000 Greeks 
in the United States in 1945, see Ibid., p. 69.
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the foundation for political arbitration which produced an 
uneasy peace agreed to at Varkiza, Greece, on February 3, 
1945.56
George C. Vournas, Supreme President of AHEPA, wrote
concerning Churchill's Athens visit* "I assume that you, too,
have read in the papers that the mighty Churchill and the sly
Eden are in Athens in order to assist the Greeks to compose
57their differences." Mr. Vournas also asked that President
Roosevelt make a public statement on events in Greece "so that
58he may preserve his moral influence on a global basis."
William D. Hassett, Secretary to the President, replied by
wire for Roosevelt: "It will not be possible for him to make
59a formal statement at this time."
On December 16, Harry Hopkins, Special Assistant to 
President Roosevelt, cabeled Churchill in reference to the 
hostility of American public opinion toward British actions
fsf)
in Greece. This hostility and disillusionment was reflected 
in a public opinion poll dated December 30, 1944. This poll
Woodward, British Foreign Policy, pp. 424-35.
57Quoted from letter, George C. Vournas to Roosevelt, 
PPF 1242, December 27, 1944.
58ibid .
59Quoted from telegram, WilliamD. Hassett to Vournas, 
PPF 1242, January 8, 1945.
f\ 0Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p . 842.
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found Britain the culprit in disrupting Big Three relations:
Of those 'dissatisfied* with Big Three Cooperation (about 
one-third of the public), 54% now blame England as com­
pared with 33% in April. On the other hand, 18% now 
blame Russia as compared with 44% in April. 61
Churchill's Athens visit was reported to have improved the
public attitude, "but suspicion remains that Churchill seeks
to dominate the Greek government against the will of the Greek 
62people." Of those polled 56 percent stated liberated coun­
tries should be allowed to create their own governments, with 
no intervention from Britain, Russia, or the United States, 
even if civil strife were the result.
Retained White House mail was divided into categories 
representing two month periods and in turn separated as to 
those expressing political or non-political opinions. Table 
I illustrates that the mail for December and January was over­
whelmingly political and expressed opposition to British 
intervention. Correspondence was again evaluated as to whether
it represented; an ethnic group; influential or non-influential
64individuals; labor groups; or other organizations.
Quoted from memorandum for President, PSF Stettinius, 
December 30, 1944; "Public Opinion," December 1944.
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
64Evaluated correspondence is located m  the following 
Official Files or Personal Presidential Files» OF 206-A, OF 
48, OF 93, OF 4847, OF 48-A, PPF 50-M, PPF.772, PPF 1242.
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TABLE I
OPINION AND SOURCES OF WHITE HOUSE MAIL
CONCERNING GREECE: OCTOBER 1944 - MARCH 194 5
1 944 
Oct/Nov
1944-45 
Dec/Jan
1945 
Feb/Mar
OPINIONS
Non-political 10(83.3%)
Liberation of
Greece
0 1(33.3%)
Political: 
opposed to 
British presence 
in Greece 2(16.7%) 14(87.5%) 1(33.3%)
Requests for U.S. 
action in Greece 
that omit refer­
ence to Britain 0 2(12.5%) 1(33.3%)
SOURCES
Ethnic Origin 7(58.3%) 4(25%) 1(33.3%)
Non-influential 
individuals 1(8.3%) 5(31.3%) 0
Influential
individuals 4(33.3%) 2(12.5%) 2(66.7%)
Labor Groups 0 3(18.8%) 0
Other Groups (Non- 
Ethnic, Non-Labor 0 2(12.5%) 0
Total Retained 
Correspondence* 12(38.7%) 16(51.6%) 3(9.7%)
"'These totals represent an unknown number of individ­
uals, as petitions and memoranda which refer to several or 
hundreds of individuals were evaluated as one. Also, it is 
not known how many individuals are represented by organiza­
tional mail.
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Correspondence for December and January was much 
higher in its condemnation of Britain than the December 30 
poll previously mentioned. Almost 88 percent of this corre­
spondence opposed British action in Greece. An additional 
12.5 percent was political in nature but made no mention of 
Britain, while requesting United States aid in solving the 
Greek dilemma. This correspondence came from more diversified 
sources than either of the two other periods. It also had the 
highest incidence of mail expressing political views. Mot 
one retained message supported British policy in Greece.
Public opinion as reported in a poll of January 6,
1945 indicated approval of a United States policy of non­
interference in the internal affairs of liberated countries. 
This poll indicated a majority disapproved of unilateral action 
on the part of Britain and the Soviet Union, but also illus­
trated a surprising degree of public apathy on foreign policy 
as only 43 percent had heard of the Dumbarton Oaks Confer­
ence.^ While the Dumbarton Oaks Conference had no direct 
bearing on correspondence concerning Greece, lack of knowledge 
concerning its proposals- would indicate the small number of 
Americans interested in foreign policy. Correspondence of a 
political nature could be expected to come from this group.
Two polls dated January 16, 1945 concur with those of 
December 30, 1944, and January 6, 1945, in condemning British
^Stettinius to Roosevelt, PSF State Department, 
January 6, .1945; "Public Opinion," January 194 5.
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policy in Greece. These polls also express the fear that a 
successful United Nations would be an impossibility in the 
face of the unilateral actions on the part of Britain and 
Russia.^
On January 16, 57 percent of those polled desired
active interest on the part of the United States in the af­
fairs of liberated countries. The impetus to this interest 
were the activities of Great Britain and Russia. ^  Political 
correspondence is much higher in the percentage requesting 
active American interest. Where correspondence condemned 
British policies in Greece, it also called for some positive 
American action. The request for positive action took two 
forms: a declaration on the part of President Roosevelt con­
demning British interference;or the presence of American mil­
itary to act in a police capacity.^
The volume of White House mail concerning Greece is 
insignificant during February and March 1945. The Varkiza 
Agreement of February 3, 1945 ended open hostilities in Greece, 
and that country was no longer one of the main concerns of the 
American press. A State Department poll on February 23, 1945
Two memos for President, PSF State Department, Jan­
uary 16, 1945} "British Interference in Regard Greece and 
Italy;" "Russian Interference in Poland."
67Ibid.
^^Supra. fn. 64.
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reflected a similar conclusion:
'Dissatisfaction' with Allied cooperation dropped 
from 43% to 25%, press and radio criticism of both Brit­
ain and Russia having sharply declined since the slack­
ening of attention to the Greek crisis and the focus of 
headlines on the Russian offensive. 69
However, a majority of the discontented group continued to 
blame Britain, not the Soviet Union, for disrupting the Allied 
cause. The poll continued: "An overwhelming majority of Amer­
icans feel that the United States should have 'as much to say '
as our British and Russian Allies in the settlement of various
70European problems growing out of the war. "
On the basis of those represented in the four polls 
cited, American opinion shifted from non-interference to a 
belief if Britain and the Soviet Union could intervene, the 
United States should. This view is reflected in correspon­
dence as early as October and November of 1944. It would 
indicate where concerned Americans found a nation's policy 
distasteful they expected their government to take some action, 
even if that action were unilateral.
Table II illustrates conclusions drawn from correspon-
71dence of October 1944 to March 1945. These percentages are
69Grew to Roosevelt, PSF State Department, February 24, 
1945; "Public Opinion," February 1945.
70ibid.
71These percentages will be different from those pre­
viously cited as they are based on a six-month total, while 
previous percentages are figured on a two-month period.
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based on a total for the entire six month period. The volume 
of retained White House mail relating to Greece increased 
from less then 39 percent in October and November to over 51 
percent in December and January. It then dropped dramatically 
in February and March. The October to January totals reflected 
the crisis period of liberation followed by the Greek Civil 
War. From October to November mail concerned the liberation 
of Greece and a majority was Greek American in origin. The 
overwhelming majority of all political mail received was in 
the period of the active Greek Civil War, from December to 
January. As has been stated, it was diversified in origin, 
and unanimous in its condemnation of British interference.
In February and March, the cessation of active hostilities 
and constant press coverage concerning Greece, is reflected 
in the decline of correspondence.
In summary, White House mail reflects the opinion of 
interested or informed individuals and organizations, and it is 
sufficiently diversified when established principles are in­
volved, in this case those of the Atlantic Charter. The mail 
for this period, October 1944 to March 1945, overwhelmingly 
condemned the initial British policy of unilateral action, 
and resented infringement of the accepted principle of re­
specting the rights of individual countries. The polls con­
sulted reached the same conclusion, but not by as great a 
majority. Both polls and correspondence indicated a growing 
belief the United States should take positive action in lib-
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TABLE II
100%
INCREASE AND DECREASE OF WHITE HOUSE MAIL 
CONCERNING GREECE
October 1944 to March 1945 
Oct/Nov 44 Dec 44/Jan 45 Feb/Mar 45
75%
50%
25%
0%
51.6%
45.6
12.80%
Legend« Percent of retained mail in a six month period in time period indicated.
Letters of a political nature by time 
period indicated.
Percent of letters from Greek American 
Societies by time period indicated.
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erated countries. The initial post World War II public impetus 
torward United States intervention in the affairs of other 
nations was the unilateral action of Great Britain in Greece.
TERRITORY CLAIMED BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT INCLUDED .
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CHAPTER III
THE "MEGALI IDEA" AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1945-1947
The student of history can very easily project what 
is presently significant upon the value systems of the past. 
In the years 1945 to 1947, within Greece , there was continuing 
demand for a liberalized social system. This effort was 
thwarted by conservative Greek politicans with the aid of a 
sympathetic Britain. Those who wished to retain traditional 
practices and perogatives caused constant conflict within a 
country whose economy and people were devastated by World War 
11.^ Yet internal political strife and economic hardship is 
not the theme of the major portion of correspondence to Pres­
ident Truman during this period. Messages concerning Greece 
ref lect territorial demands of the Greek government, conf irming 
the conclusion of Gabriel A. Almond regarding ethnic groups:
The influence of foreign ethnic and linguistic 
groups on American foreign policy generally takes the 
form of efforts to enlist American support for policies 
affecting their homelands. Historically such influence 
was mainly directed toward traditional national aims such 
as the preservation or return of national territory. 2
^For an account of the devastation imposed on the 
Greek economy and population by the Germans, see George Exin- 
taris, "The Position in Greece," International Affairs. Vol. 
20 (April 1944), pp. 204-11.
2
Almond, American People, p. 183.
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Within the two year period following the death of
Franklin Roosevelt, and President Truman*s announcement of the
"Truman Doctrine" on March 12,1947, almost 85 percent of the
total retained correspondence concerning Greece was political 
3in nature. Of this political mail, over 72 percent supported 
Greek territorial and reparation claims and less than 28 per­
cent concerned the political conflict in Greece. The minority 
of the political messages dealt with the continued presence 
of British forces, abuses by the right wing government, and 
the Greek elections in March and September of 1946.
The Greek government had as its primary foreign policy 
territorial claims and reparation for war damages. Work 
toward this end was begun by the government while still in 
exile, and intensified between 1945 and 1947. In addition, 
financial assistance in the form of loans and grants was con­
tinually requested from both Britain and the United States. 
The primary use of loans was to be for maintaining a military 
force, not reconstruction.^
Territorial aggrandizement in Greek is called the
—
This correspondence is retained OF 206-M, Box 778, 
"Truman Doctrine" (Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, 
Missouri). All unpublished manuscripts in this chapter are 
from this source, unless otherwise designated, and hereinaf ter 
will be cited by description, file number, and date only.
^Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers. pp. xiii, 96, 
99, 228, 256 s see also United States Department of State, 
Foreign Relations, of the United States (1945), Vol. VIII, 
"The Near Eastand Africa," Pubn^ 8427 (1969), pp. 193-300; 
(Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1945), VIII).
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"Megali Idea" or the "Great Idea. " The "Megali Idea" has been
-* be f*4z.
of paramount importance in Greek politics since 1864. Its 
emotional appeal has succeeded in subjugating any political 
issue throughout this century. This dream of a "Greater 
Greece" incorporated all territories once part of Byzantium, 
and includes all areas where Greek-speaking peoples form a 
majority of the population. Greek-Americans retained this 
desire and successf ully supported it among non-Greek-Americans. 
The "Megali Idea" has captured the Greek imagination to the 
extent that no national issue seems to have equaled or sub­
merged its attraction."*
Within Greece, the "Megali Idea" was used by right 
wing politicians during 1945 and 1946 to further their own 
interests. Greek territorial claims successfully submerged 
domestic economic and social problems. The Populists, who 
favored the return of the King, maintained they must be elected 
or the United States and Great Britain would not support Greek 
territorial claims. These claims, many dating from 1912, cen­
tered on territories along the northern Greek borders* North 
Epirus or Southern Albania; an extension of the Greek border 
into Bulgaria; and Macedonia which included territory claimed 
by Yugoslavia. In addition, the Dodecanese Islands, which 
were Italian controlled, and located in the Aegean, were 
claimed. Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia, of course, did
^Forster, Short History, pp. 20, 32; see also Saloutos, 
"The Greeks in the United States," p. 73.
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not accept the righteousness of the Greek cause, and Greek 
territorial claims caused constant f riction with these Balkan 
countries. In addition, leftist groups within Greece found 
sanctuary in Yugoslavia and Albania, thus adding to political 
friction. The Greek government used fears of foreign inter­
vention from its northern neighbors as well as territorial 
claims to distract the Greek people. The issue created a 
gordian knot, as Greece aggravated its Balkan neighbors by 
claiming their territory, and these countries in return of­
fered sanctuary to political elements in opposition to the 
Greek government and claimed Greece- instigated border inci­
dents to get British and United States support. The Greek 
left became associated by some Americans and Greeks with the 
international designs of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet 
Union supported Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia rather than 
Greece, both the Greek leftist movement, and the Soviet Union 
suffered in popularity. In addition, the implications of 
Greek territorial claims were to broaden the growing conflict 
between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union in 
1945 and 1946. The Soviet Union supported the Balkan govern­
ments as opposed to Britain and the United States which aided 
Greece.
z
Stavrianos, Greece; American Dilemma, p. 170; Wil­
liam Hardy McNeill, The Greek Dilemma; War and Aftermath (New 
York; J, B. Lippincott Co., 1947), pp. 244-52; (Hereinafter 
cited as McNeill, Greek Dilemma); Xydis, Greece and The Great 
Powers. pp. 15-16, 100-101, 294-95; see also Kousoulas, Rev­
olution and Defeat, forward by C. M. Woodhouse, p. vi.
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Greek territorial demands had tremendous appeal and 
support in the United States. Greek-American societies, as 
well as a non-ethnic society, the "Justice for Greece Commit­
tee," were active in petitioning the United States government 
to further Greek claims. The Justice for Greece Committee was 
organized in the United States in October, 1945. Initially 
it was sponsored by ‘Greek American societies, such as AHEPA 
and the Panepirotic Society, but many non-Greeks became mem­
bers and served on the advisory board. Among its influential 
leaders were Mrs. Calvin Coolidge, Honorary Chairman; Sumner 
Welles, Chairman, Advisory Board; Edwin L. James of the New 
York Times; James Truslow Adams, American historian; and U. S. 
Senators Robert Taft and Arthur Vandenberg. Eventually more 
than 33 percent of the United States Senate belonged to this 
organization. Because of this committee's work, the Senate 
passed Resolution 82 in the spring of 1946. Initially spon­
sored by Senator Claude D. Pepper of Florida, this resolution 
was in support of Greek territorial claims. Literature from 
the Justice for Greece Committee stressed the strategic impor­
tance of Greece, and declared that its political difficulties 
were the result of the confrontation between communist and 
democratic beliefs. This literature also emphasized Greek
ties to Western democratic nations, as Greece had given birth 
7
to democracy.
~ ^Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers. Annex VI, "The
Justice for Greece Committee," pp. "7lT-T3T~~
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In voicing the demands of the Greek government, the 
Justice for Greece Committee and the Greek- American societies 
were f urthering the aims of right wing elements within Greece. 
The leftist EAM and KKE publically acceded to the popular 
appeal of the "Megali Idea," but originally stressed recon­
structing Greek political and economic conditions, not ter­
ritorial claims. Had the left obtained power, it is unlikely 
they would have pushed these claims, certainly not in the 
Balkans. The left, however, publicly included British con­
trolled Cyprus within its territorial demands. This was a 
rather pointed reminder that the right had dropped the issue
g
of Cyprus since acquiring British military support.
A Democratic National Committee memorandum of October
17, 1944 refers to the majority of the Greek-American commu-
9nity as "liberal." Within a two year period the "Megali 
Idea" successfully attracted Greek-American sympathies to the 
aspirations of a right wing Greek government, and signifi­
cantly attracted United States government leaders to sympa­
thize with the Greek cause. This "cause" increasingly aggra­
vated tensions between the British, the United States and the 
Soviet Union as the small nations involved elicited support
o
Eudes , Kapetanios t pp. 245-46; McNeill, The Greek 
Dilemma. p. 256.
^Memorandum, Charles Olson to James Barnes, OF 772, 
October 17, 1944 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, 
New York).
53
from these more powerful countries.^ In addition the Justice 
for Greece Committee distributed literature among U. S. gov­
ernment officials. Of the correspondence to President Truman 
in 1946, over 59 percent represented influential individual 
sources, (e.g.- newspaper editors, church leaders, state'and 
government officials). A majority of that correspondence was 
from members of Congress. Literature made available by the 
Justice for Greece Committee, and distributed to congressmen 
stressed that a conflict of "ideologies" centered in Greece, 
and portrayed Greece as a bulwark of democracy in the Medi­
terranean. As early as 1945, the Justice for Greece Committee 
proclaimed the United States would inevitably have to inter­
vene on the side of democracy.^ An example of the many mes­
sages to President Truman from this organization, stressing 
Greece's strategic location and her significance as a constant 
American ally stated*
Trieste, Dardanelles and Suez without Greece are use­
less to the westerners . . .Mr. President we appeal to
you to make your great influence felt on the subject. 
Please use vision and fight to save the imperiled 
little nation which is the best and most dependable 
friend of America. Respectfully "The Justice for Gre­
ece Committee," Mrs. Calvin Coilidge honorary Chair­
man, Chauncy Hamlin Chairman, Sumner Welles. 12
James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York and Lon­
don: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), pp. 73, 100-101, 
115-17; ('Hereinafter cited as Byrnes, Speaking Frankly. )
^Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, p. 711; see 
correspondence concerning Greece, OF 206-M, Box 778.
12 Telegram, "The Justice For Greece Committee," to 
Truman: for other.examples, see OF 206-M, Box 778, October 9,
1946.
54
Both AHEPA and the Justice for Greece Committee were
active in supporting all Greek territorial gains to North
Epirus, the Dodecanese Islands, and ratification of Greek
13claims on the Bulgarian frontier. The Panepirotic Federa­
tion of America, whose headquarters were in Worcester, Massa­
chusetts, was devoted exclusively to Greek acquisition of 
North Epirus. This society wrote many letters to President 
Truman throughout 1945 and 1946. Letters concerning North 
Epirus were submitted to delegates to the San Francisco Con­
ference, and to President Truman, Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill and Marshall Joseph Stalin at Potsdam in 1945. North 
Epirus was represented as historically belonging to Greece, 
with a majority population of Greek-speaking peoples. As to 
its present condition as part of Albania, the Potsdam letter 
stated a recurring theme:
It has been forced to become a part of Albania, under 
whose yoke it has suffered grievously, and now is faced 
with the extermination of its martyred inhabitants by 
Enver Hoxha's orders, whose manifest purpose is to change 
the Greek character of this region through persecution 
and expulsion. 14
Greece claimed atrocities were constantly committed against
the Greek population of Albania, and also opposed Albanian
13Telegram, "The Justice For Greece Committee," to 
Truman, March 9, 1946, April 22, 1946; letter, AHEPA to Tru­
man, June 12, 1946, July 16, 1946.
^Letter, the National Committee of the Panepirotic 
Federation of American, Inc. , to Truman, Churchill and Stalin, 
OF 206-M, Box 778, August 1945.
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membership in the United Nations. The United States supported 
this opposition and the issue of North Epirus caused constant 
conflict at the Paris Peace Conference, from July to October
1946. Both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union supported Albania, 
in opposition to Greece and her patrons, Britain and the United 
States.^ Simultaneous with these disagreements, Yugoslavia 
accused the United States of violating Yugoslavian air space. 
In August 1945, two American transports were forced down by 
the Yugoslavian Air Force. As an unprovoked incident, this 
caused widespread resentment and tension within the United
1 /r
States. These actions of Yugoslavia, should be viewed in 
a wider context of Balkan border disputes and the resulting 
big nation alignment on the side of the participants.
Records of the United States Department of State do 
not reveal sentimental attachment to Greek claims. These 
records reveal a clear knowledge of events within Greece, and 
a realistic assessment of the Greek government and its claims . ^
Greece did not receive North Epirus, or an extension 
of the Greek northern border into Bulgaria. The issue served
Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 271, 277, 
293-95; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 142.
^Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 144-46.
^ FRUS (1945), VIII, 300-58; United States Department 
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1946), Vol. 
VII, "The Near East and Africa," Pubn. 8490 (1969). pp. 135-36, 
139-43, 145-47; (Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1946), VII).
5.6
no purpose but that of creating friction within the Balkans
1 o
and between Anglo-American and Soviet interests. Greece
was awarded the Dodecanese Islands. These Aegean Islands were
recognized as an important access to the Dardanelles and Black
Sea by the United States Department of State, which originally
requested, on April 17, 1945, that they be put under British
military control. The Dodecanese were awarded to Greece by
19the Council of Foreign Ministers in June 1946. Greek con­
trol of the Dodecanese would further intensify that country0s
20strategic interest to the United States.
During 1945 and 1946, almost 28 percent of White House 
mail which was political in nature, reflected the internal 
situation in Greece, rather then territorial or reparation 
claims. This correspondence mirrored a worsening political 
situation that would make free Greek elections difficult, and 
an increasing resentment over the continued presence of British 
forces. A series of right wing governments entrenched con­
servative power within the Greek military, the gendarmerie,
^Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 205, 318- 
35? McNeill, Greek Dilemma^ pp. 259-60.
19FRUS (1945), VIII, 307-8, U. S, Ambassador Lincoln 
MacVeagh reported on the return of the Dodecanese : "Contrasting 
with officialdom and the party press, general public has 
shown little enthusiasm. . . .''See also FRUS (1946), VII, 173.
20For Greece's strategic significance, see George 
Fielding Eliot, "Why.We Have Military Missions in 17 Nations," 
Readers Digest, Vol. 53 (October 1948), pp. 132-35.
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local police, and the government bureaucracy. The British did 
not allow open press censorship, but the Greek government re­
stricted the paper allotment to the leftist press, and raised 
rates on left wing periodicals to curtail their activities. 
British military authorities would not allow officers with 
royalist sympathies to be removed from the Greek armed forces. 
These monarchist off icers controlled the Royal Hellenic troops . 
Members of the anti-monarchist Liberal party and of the left­
ist parties were forced to forego military careers, or join 
the increasing bands of guerrilla forces. Both university 
professors and civil servants were replaced if their records 
indicated liberal or leftist sympathies. These right wing 
activities were in clear violation of the Varkiza Agreement 
made on February 12, 1945 which guaranteed no reprisals against
EAM members or any liberal group, and promised the creation
21of a Greek government incorporating both left and right.
Greek Archbishop Damaskinos served as Regent from 
January 1945 to September 1946. The Greek premiers during 
1945 were liberal General Nicholas Plastiras, who was forced
2TNews release by Greek American Committee for Na­
tional Unity. OF 206-A, March 2 9, 1945 (Roosevelt Library); 
see the following from OF 206-M, Box 778 (Truman Library)j 
letter, Harry Anton, President, Hellenic-American Fraternal 
Society. Detroit, Michigan, to Edward Stettinius (copy to Sen­
ator Vandenberg), May 17, 1945; cablegram, Demetris Partsa- 
lides, EAM, to Truman, June 18, 1945; petition requesting 
Greek government representative of right and left to United 
States, Soviet Union and British supervision of Greek elec­
tions, August 1945; letter, Spyros P. Skouras to Truman, 
September 4, 1945; letter, George P. Skouras to Judge Samuel 
Rosenman, November 20, 1945.
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to resign by royalists, and replaced by the ultra-monarchist
Admiral Petros Voulgaris in April; Volgaris resigned in
October as his government was accused of' right wing terror
and repression of all Greek liberal elements. Archbishop
Damaskinos served as Premier and Regent until a short-lived
government was created under Premier Panayiotis Kanellopoulos
the last of October; finally a British-instigated government
was formed under aging Liberal, Themistoclis Sofoulis in Nov- 
22ember. On March 31, 1946 the first postwar Greek election 
returned a Populist majority thus creating a royalist govern­
ment. Constantine Tsaldaris became Prime Minister, and on
September 1, 1946 a plebiscite returned George II to the Greek 
23throne. As Premier followed Premier and King followed
22FRUS (1945), VIII, 122-25, 169, 182-84. Informa- 
tion sent to the White House by George P. Skouras, included 
Constantine Poulas, "Greek Tragedy, 1945," The Nation (Nov­
ember 3, 1945) OF 206-M, Box 778, November 20, 1945? see also 
address by Andre Michalopoulos to The Forum of' the Cooperative 
Committee. Washington, D. C., March 19,1947, concerning con­
ditions within Greece, 1945-1946 in OF 206-M, Box 778.
23 . .Cablegram, John Sophianopoulos, Elo Svolos, Hadjibeis
Agrarian Gavrilides, Kyrkos, Kritikas to Truman, OF 206-M, 
Box 778, April 8 , 1946. Other accounts that question the hon­
esty of the March 31, 1946, election and September 1, 1946, 
plebiscite are* George de Santillana, "The Greek Elections," 
The New Republic. Vol. 114 (April 8 , 1946), pp. 496-97; Basil 
Vlavianos, "Greece and Its Allies," The Nation. Vol. 163 
(September 28, 1946), pp. 344-46. Basil Vlavianos was the 
liberal publisher and editor of the National Herald a New 
York Greek language newspaper. His correspondence to Presi­
dent Roosevelt has been quoted, see supra. Chapter II; "Greece 
Ballots in Chaos," Newsweek. Vol. 27 (April 1, 1946), pp. 45- 
46; "Greece* Battle Royal," Newsweek. Vol. 17 (April 22,1946), 
pp. 46-47; Smith, State of Europe, pp. 234-35..
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Regent, there was little significant improvement in the con­
dition of the Greek people, or the inflation ridden Greek econ­
omy. The Greek government devoted itself to territorial and 
reparation claims, and increasing the military. No adequate 
program or budget for reconstruction was attempted, as a result 
the Greek population suffered a lack of food, shelter, and 
jobs. Relief supplies provided by UNRRA and such agencies as
American Relief for Greek Democracy were poorly distributed,
24and m  many cases were the <subject of profiteering. Mean­
while, the Greek countryside was torn with civil strife, as 
right battled left across the provinces of Greece. Two years 
of rightist suppression forced liberal and leftist Greeks to
join the outlawed guerrilla forces and Greece was to experi-
25ence continual civil war until the fall of 1949.
'j
Letter, Robert St. John to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 
778, December 18, 1946; see also Ernest 0 . Hauser, "Europe's 
Most Frightened Country." Saturday Evening Post. Vol. 218, 
(December Z9, 1945), pp. 9-11, 44, 47; Hal Lehrman "Athens 
Calling," The Nation. Vol. 160 (May 5, 1945), pp. 515-17; 
"The Shape of Things," The Nation, Vol. 163 (December 28, 
1946), p. 741.
25Heinz Eulau, "Counter-Revolution in Greece," The 
New Republic. Vol. 113 (July 30, 1945), pp. 121-22; "Bad Faith 
in Greece," The New Republic. Vol. 112 (May 28, 1945), p. 727; 
L. S. Stavrianos, "Vacuum in Greece." The New Republic. Vol. 
113 (December 24 1945) , pp. 863-65 ; Major J. A. Whitely, "Our­
selves and Greece*," The Nineteenth Century. Vol. 139 (March 
1946), pp. 101-105. Civil War ended in Greece in the summer 
of 1949. The Greek National Army was directed and supplied by 
the United States. Napalm was first used at this time, see 
O'Ballance, Greek Civil War, pp. 198-99. For a Greek^ author,'s 
fictionalized, but true picture of Greek civil strife, see 
Nikcs* Kazantzakis , The 7Fratricides , trans . by Athena Gianakas 
Dallas (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964).
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The Greek American Council in New York City was the 
most active American based agency supporting the Greek left 
and liberal forces. This group published the EAM acoount of 
British intervention and subsequent Civil War. Entitled, 
National Liberation Front E.A.M. White Book, and first pub­
lished in Trikkala, Greece in February 1945, this text was
76sent to President Truman by George P. Skouras. In November 
1945, the Greek American Council released copies of a British 
document dated August 12, 1943 to the American press. This 
document, a confidential report to British Middle East Head­
quarters, was the report of a British agent's work within 
Greece to undermine EAM, and turn its members over to German 
forces. The report also contained evidence of active British
support for conservative resistance organizations such as EKKA
27which had pronounced royalist sympathies. Throughout 1945 
and 1946, the Greek American Council wrote President Truman 
protesting conditions within Greece, and requesting United 
States action that would end royalist suppression, and create 
a coalition government incorporating both left and right.
In September of 1945, the United States announced its 
intention of participating in an Allied mission to oversee
7 6
EAM White Book forwarded to White House by George 
Skouras, OF 206-M, Box 778, October 26, 1945.
^ New York Post, November 9, 1945, p. 2; OF 206-M, 
Box 778, TfTis account is supported by research for this study 
supra. Chapter II.
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Greek elections. This election mission was originally pro­
posed at Potsdam and was to include representatives from the 
United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union declined on the grounds such a mission consti­
tuted interference in the internal affairs of Greece. Composed 
of British, French, and American members, the mission arrived 
in Athens, in December 1945. Few of the American group, 
which was mainly composed of military officers under the lead-
2 g
ership of Henry F. Grady, spoke Greek. Both liberal and
leftist groups within Greece feared early elections. It was
felt royalist control of the local and national government
agencies, plus the activities of the royalist bands of X-ites
29would make any attempt at open elections meaningless.
The Greek American Council petitioned President Truman
to delay elections until conditions could be improved:
Honest elections March 31 in Greece impossible under 
present conditions of fraud and violence imprisonment 
of anti-fascist and determination all democratic parties 
to abstain from fake elections. Greek democratic press 
and even Greek cabinet members have declared honest 
elections impossible March 31 and calls for postpone­
ment. < . . . Yet Great Britain intervenes to insist
elections be held. We urge American government and State 
Department sharply disassociate United States from this 
intervention on side Greek reactionary. . . .  30
^ FRUS (1945), VIII, 98-147.
29Report of The Allied Mission to Observe Greek Elec­
tions , 19461 OF 206-F. Box 719 , pp"! 22-23.
3 0Telegram, Greek American Council to Truman, OF 206-M, 
Box 778, March 4, 1946.
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The Greek American Council, which also was known as
the American Council For a Democratic Greece, was later placed
31on the Attorney General's list of subversive societies. Yet 
the correspondence from this society reflected the views of re­
spected American correspondents who witnessed events within 
Greece. George Weller of The Chicago Daily News? Leland Stowe, 
New York Post Syndicate; and Howard K. Smith all reported 
their findings in the American press. In addition, the works 
of American historian, L. S. Stavrianos, supported the con-
32elusions of the Greek American Council on these conditions.
George P. Skouras, New York City, was the most vocal 
of the individual correspondents in opposition to British 
intervention, the Greek right wing government, and the deci­
sion of holding elections in March. Skouras and his brother, 
Spyros P. Skouras, national President of the Greek War Relief
Association, Inc., visited Greece and reported on their findings 
33to Truman. George Skouras was in Athens in November and
^Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, p. 713; "Armed 
Forces Security Questionnaire: Organizations Designated by the
Attorney General, Pursuant to Executive Order 10450," lists 
the Council of Greek -Americans "as having signif icance in con^ 
nection with the National Security."
37 .George Weller, "Rightest Rule Stays in Greece," Chi­
cago Daily News, April 9, 194 5, p. 2; Leland Stowe's reports 
are included in Stowe, While Time Remains, pp. 242-70; Howard 
K. Smith, The State of Europe and L. S. Stavrianos, Greek 
Pi lemma.
3 3Letter, Spyros P. Skouras to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 
778, September 4, 194 5; letter, George P. Skouras to Judge 
Rosenman, OF 206-M, Box 778, November 12, 1945.
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December 1944 and interviewed Greek leaders of the left and 
right. The report of this visit supports evidence that the 
revolt resulted from British and Greek right wing intransi­
gence. Skouras witnessed the events of December 3, and re­
ported the crowd was fired on by police with no provocation. 
He found Greek politicians t
. . . too excited and inclined to find . . . , that
though the opposition pretended to be democratic and lib­
erals, down in their hearts they were all 'Communists1 
and they were taking their orders from Moscow and acting 
in Greece in the same manner as everywhere else in Europe, 
the whole idea being a general uprising of the 'Communists* 
all over Europe in order to upset the Anglo-American 
policy. 34
In March 1946, Mr. Skouras wrote President Truman, as
"the only hope of 7,000,000 people" and requested that the
3 5Greek elections set for March 31, be delayed. His letter 
included recommendations that the Greek army and police force 
be broadened to include men of all political persuasions, and 
a new Greek voter registration be made under the supervision 
of an Allied mission composed of representatives from Britain, 
the United States, and the Soviet Union. Of considerable 
value in understanding the f uture political climate in Greece 
were Skouras's listed objections to why elections should be 
postponed. His (Objections emphasized the easy accessibility
O /
Letter and report, George P. Skouras., OF 206-M, Box 
7 70, January 3, 1945.
3 5Letter, George P. Skouras to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 
778, March 22, 1946.
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of voter registration books, claiming American Embassy offi­
cials had received authorizations to vote and further charged 
Monarchist sympathizers were furnished registration certifi­
cates that represented dead and non-existent individuals. 
Conditions were so unfavorable that even Premier Sophoulis 
recommended elections be delayed. But more important, the 
British director of elections, Colonel C. M. Woodhouse, "the 
man above all others distrusted by Greeks who fought the resis­
tance because of what they considered his Machiavellian role 
in their Civil War," had complete charge of the election mis-
O £
sion, including the American delegation.
The Allied mission reported that in spite of voter 
registration lists which were ten years old and some evidence 
of intimidation, the Greek elections of March 31, 1946 re­
flected the wishes of a majority of the Greek people. The 
report recommended that a Greek census be taken, and new voter 
registration lists be compiled before the plebiscite on the
Letter, George P. Skouras to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 
778, March 22, 1946; Skouras*s report on Greek conditions is 
supported by sources, supra. fn. 23; see also Stavrianos, 
Greece: American Dilemma, pp. 174-75. C. M. Woodhouse served 
as Commander of the British Military operating with the Greek 
resistance during World War II. In 1946, he was Secretary- 
General of the Allied Mission to observe elections. He was 
anti-EAM/ELAS. For an account of his experiences and views, 
see C. M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord; A Survey of Recent 
Greek Politics in Their International Setting, forward by the 
Rt. Hon. Lord Altrincham (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 
1948); (Hereinafter cited as Woodhouse, Apple of Discord).
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37King's return. A British Parliamentary Delegation which
visited Greece in August 1946 also recommended an updating of
3 8voter registration lists and new elections.
During the months of 1945 and 1946, United States and 
Soviet relations steadily worsened. It is not the purpose of 
this paper to examine the rights or wrongs of that conflict. 
But, just as British policy found a friendly Greece impera­
tive in 1944, the United States discovered a similar need by
1947. The United States and the Soviet Union began to clash 
over the Balkans at the Potsdam Conference. Throughout 1945 
and 1946, the Soviet Union was determined to maintain the 
Anglo-Soviet agreement of October 1944. The United States 
was equally determined to support the principles of the Dec­
laration on Liberated Europe made at the Yalta Conference in 
February 1945. This Declaration, based on the Atlantic Char­
ter, stated the principle of self-determination for liberated 
39natrons. Truman felt this principle was infringed upon by
37Report of The Allied Mission to Observe Greek Elec­
tions. 1946, OF 206-F. Box 7 79, pp. 22, 26-27. EAM boycotted 
the election. This practice is considered a valid form of 
political expression within Greece. Liberal parties originally 
threatened to boycott, but were persuaded to take part, f'bid.. 
pp. 25-26.
3 8Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma, p. 181.
3 9Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, pp. 562-63; see 
also Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 264-67.
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40the Soviet Union in its relations with smaller nations.
The Soviet Union countered charges against Soviet control in
the Balkans, by referring to undemocratic conditions within 
41Greece. That there is validity in these charges may be
found in the number of instances the British Labor government
sought a broadening of the Greek government to include all
parties, and the British government's attempts to curtail
42right wing repression. In its turn, the United States re­
sponded to Greek requests for financial assistance by recom­
mending more democratic institutions and a national program 
of reconstruction. Illustrative of American views on Greek 
aid was a Treasury Depratment memorandum in October 1 946 which 
asserted that* "The Greeks must tackle their own internal
problems seriously before expecting substantial monetary
43assistance from the United States."
The Greek internal situation became incidental within 
the larger context of United States interest in the Near East
^Truman, Harry -S. Truman, p. 343.
^Charles E. Bohlen, Witness To History* 1929-1969 
(New York* W. W. Norton and Co. , Inc. , 1 9 7 3 p*. 234; (Here- 
inafter cited as Bohlen, Witness To History.’)
/ 9
Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 130, 137, 
151, 211, 233, 247, 254, 276, 300.
^William H. Taylor to Treasury Secretary Snyderf 
"Information on Greek Delegation," Snyder File, Box 19 (Octo­
ber, 1946; see also Xydis. Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 
146, 259, 263; FRUS (1945). VIII. 213-15. 237; FRUS (1946), 
VII, 170, 187-88.
and Mediterranean. That interest opposed Soviet influence
in Iran, Turkey, and the Eastern Mediterranean.^ Greece's
geographic location and control of the Dodecanese Islands
negated the importance of a "dirty gray" government within 
45that country. In addition, Truman's advisors such as Averell
Harrimar* Ambassador, to the Soviet Union; George F. Kennan artd
Charles E. Bohlen of the Embassy in Moscow; Secretary of State
James F. Byrnes. Chief of Staff William D. Leahy; Secretary
of the Navy James Forrestal; and Presidential aide Clark
Clifford came to feel threatened by the actions of the Soviet
Union. They felt containment of that country's influence
46offered the only protection for the United States. Through 
the efforts of these men, and the decisions of President 
Truman, the United States adopted Britain's historic role in 
the Mediterranean: contain Russia.
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes adhered- to a bi­
partisan foreign policy principle. Byrnes maintained the
^Truman. Years of Trial, pp. 93 96-,98.
45Jones. Fifteen Weeks. Jones describes the Greek gov­
ernment in 1947, as "undemocratic, corrupt, and reactionary." 
He concludes that this type of government might be described 
as "a rather dirty gray," ibid., pp. 184-85.
4-6Kaiser, Cold Winter, pp. 126-27; Xydis, Greece and 
The Great Powers. Annex V, "G. F. Kennan*s Dispatch of Feb- 
ruary 22, 1946," pp. 699-709; Bohlen, Witness To History, pp. 
260-63; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 282-97; Frank Gervasi, 
"Watchdog in the White House," Colliers. Vol. 122 (October 9, 
1948), pp. 18, 76-77; Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 172-73; 
Leigh White, "Truman's One-Man Brain Trust." Saturday Evening 
Post. Vol. 220 (October 4, 1947), p. 113.
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righteousness of open diplomacy, but at the same time expected
47acceptance of all State Department decisions. Those knowl­
edgeable of official policy were automatically to agree with 
that policy's implementation. On September 12, 194^ Secretary 
of Commerce Henry A. Wallace, publicly disagreed with the 
evolving United States policy toward the Soviet Union. This 
speech resulted in a furor in the American press, and in gov­
ernment circles. Wallace was forced to resign that same 
48month. Henry Wallace had his Greek counterpart, John Soph­
ianopoulos. Sophianopoulos had served in.the Greek Cabinet 
as Foreign Minister and as Greece's delegate to the San Fran­
cisco Conference. As Greece's delegate to the first meeting 
of the Security Council of the United Nations, he refused 
his government's instructions to repudiate Soviet charges 
against the presence of British troops in Greece. The Soviet
Union had charged the British troops ‘ in Greece "were an instru-
. 49ment of political pressure, Sophianopoulos was recalled
by his government in January 1946. Historian.S. G. Xydis has 
referred to Sophianopoulos as "a small-state Wallace" who
^Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 233-3 5.
^ Chicago Daily News. September 13, 1946, p. 9; Sep­
tember 14, 1946, p. 1, 6 ; September 20, 1946, p. 1: headline, 
"Truman Fires Wallace;" see also John Morton Blum, ed., The 
Price of Vision: Diary of Henry A. Wallace. 1942-1946 (Bos­
ton: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), pp. 609-32.
^Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 260.
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desired Greece to serve as a ’'bridge” in British and Soviet
50relations. When Sophianopoulos visited the United States 
in January 1947, Demetrius N. Protopapas of New York City 
advised President Truman to "seize him and send him back to 
Tito."~^ Against this background of strained international 
relations and intolerance of opposing views, President Truman, 
himself now a member of AHEPA, announced the "Truman Doctrine, ” 
March 12, 1947.52
These international events were not expressed to any 
extent in Presidential correspondence. The theme of the mail 
in the period 1945 to 1947 centered on the issue of the "Megali 
Idea" of territorial acquisition. A breakdown of correspon­
dence by year indicates to what extent the "Megali Idea" dom­
inated White House mail. The increase in mail from influential 
sources in 1946 reflects the increasing pressure placed on 
United States legislators to support Greek territorial claims. 
Mail protesting Greek internal conditions decreases in 1946 
from that of 1945. This may reflect emerging communist hege­
mony in the Balkans or the political climate previously men­
tioned. While overall political mail declined from 1945 to
~^Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, p. 165.
Letter, Demetrius N. Pxotopapas to Truman, OF 106-M, 
Box 7 78, January 17, 1947,
52Truman became a member of AHEPA, June, 1946; letter, 
Marie L. Zaharakos to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 778, June 19, 1946.
to 1946, the percentage of political mail reflecting the 
"Megali Idea" increased. Table III illustrates the preponder­
ance of mail supporting Greek territorial claims. These.fig­
ures suggest Greece would elicit considerable sympathetic 
support when President Truman requested aid to that country 
in March 1947.“^
An evaluation of White House correspondence from April 
1945, to March 11, 1947, suggests a curious contradiction. 
The volume of mail by month is higher in correspondence polit­
ical in nature than that in the months evaluated for 1944 and 
1945, but most striking, retained political mail in 1945 and 
1946 reflected views of a right wing Greek government. Polit­
ical mail for October 1944 through March 1945, reflected views 
opposed to the establishment of that government. This con­
trast may be explained by a historic evaluation of the emo­
tional appeal of the "Megali Idea" on Americans of Greek her­
itage. In addition, the creation of communist governments in 
Yugoslavia, Albania, Rumania, and Bulgaria lent credence to 
the Greek government's claims of "communist" designs on that 
country. Territorial claims by the Greek government created 
a political climate almost impossible to evaluate. A United 
Nations Commission found evidence to support Greek charges 
that Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria were aiding Greek
53Evaluated correspondence is located OF 206-M, Box 
778, "Truman Doctrine," Truman Library.
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table III
WHITE HOUSE MAIL CONCERNING GREECE 
1945 - March 1947
1945 1946 Jan-Mar 47
OPINIONS
Non Political 4(4.88%) 16(25.0%) 3(75.0%)
Political 78(95.12%) 48(75.0%) 1(25.0%)
"Megali Idea" 49(62.82%) 42(87.5%) 1(100.0%)
Opposed Internal con­
ditions in Greece; 
Actions of Greek gov­
ernment; Presence of 
British; Validity of 
elections 29(37.18%) 6(12.5%) 0
SOURCES
Greek American Societies 66(80.48%) 17(26.56%) 1(25.0%)
The Justice For Greece 
Committee 5(6.10%) 7(10.94%) 0
Influential Individuals 9(10.98%) 38(59.38%) 1(25.0%)
Non-Influential Individuals 2( 2.44%) 2( 3.13%) 2(50.0%)
Organized Labor 0 0 0
Total Retained mail by year 82(54.677.) 64(42.67%) 4( 2.67%)
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leftist guerri1las. But it is almost impossible to deter­
mine to what extent this aid was provoked by the actions of 
the Greek government in claiming territory within these areas. 
vVhat is evident is that the "Megali Idea" attracted tremendous
support from Greek-Americans, and gained widespread support
55from United States legislators. Although there was con­
siderable political mail protesting conditions in Greece, it 
was not as great a percentage as a knowledge of Greek con­
ditions would warrant.. These conditions were publicized in 
the United States, as evidenced by the representative articles 
from periodicals of the period cited in this chapter. One 
must conclude that Americans were engrossed in their own post­
war affairs, but what is also suggested is there was a devel­
oping political climate that would accept any form of govern­
ment in Greece as long as it could not be labeled communist.
5^ jU. S. Department of State, The United Nations and 
The Problem of Greece, Near Eastern Series 9, Pubn. 2909, 
(September 1947 ) , p . 23-16.
55'The following is a partial list of legislators who 
wrote Truman supporting the "Megali Idea," 1945-46; Vincent 
F. Kilborn, Alabama; Pat McCarran, Nevada; W. Scott Lucus, 
Illinois; Claude Pepper, Florida; Hugh D. Scott, Jr. Penn­
sylvania; Hardie Scott, Pennsylvania; James Gallager, Penn­
sylvania; James 0. Eastland, Mississippi; W. J. Bryan Dorn, 
South Carolina? Edith Nourse Rogers, Massachusetts. In add­
ition, governors, mayors, postmasters, V.F.W. organizations, 
and church officials of the Greek Orthodox and Episcopal 
Churches are represented in mail supporting Greek territorial 
claims, OF 206-M, Box 77 8.
CHAPTER IV
AMERICAN REACTION TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
Britain, having re-established a monarchist government 
in Greece, attempted to broaden that government and restrain 
right wing activities in 1945 and 1946. Yet, Greece made 
minimal social and economic progress during these years. By 
1947 the majority of the population remained almost as des­
titute as in the days following liberation. Greek officials 
failed to institute reconstruction programs; they instead uti­
lized the appeal of a "Greater Greece" to distract the popu­
lation. When criticized for the lack of improvements, the 
Greek government charged harassment by its Balkan neighbors, 
and claimed that this disrupted reconstruction.^-
Following World War II, many Americans expressed sym-
2pathy for the EAM - led nationalist movement within Greece. 
However, from 1945 to 1947 opposition to British intervention 
and the Greek monarchy gave way to an increasing support for 
the royalist government. As has been seen, the historic appeal
Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma, pp. 176-7 9; 
see also Richard J, Barnett, Intervention and Revolution: The 
United States in The Third World (New York: The World Pub­
lishing Co., 1968 J, p5 109; (Hereinafter cited as Barnett, 
Intervention and Revolution).
2
McNeill, Greek D i l e m m a p. 248, maintains Greek in­
surgents led a nationalist movement.
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of a "Greater Greece" and the fear of communism frequently 
altered liberal sympathy. Soviet intransigence became asso­
ciated in the minds of many Americans with a communistic 
political system, and both were rejected and feared. Con­
fronted with British intervention in Greece and Soviet inter­
vention in the rest of the Balkans, Americans indicated a 
readiness to accept unilateral action on the part of the United 
States, but Americans in 1947 also retained hope for an effec­
tive United Nations. This hope diminished as United States 
off icials came to feel this nation's interests were.threatened 
in the Mediterranean. The repressive nature of the Greek gov­
ernment lost its importance when an alternative government 
might prove communist and Soviet-influenced.
On February 24 , 1947, Britain, claiming economic hard­
ship, informed the United States government of its inability 
to maintain troops in Greece after March 31. The House of 
Commons had been advised four months previously, and both 
Britain and Greece expected the United States to come to 
Greece's aid. This expectation was based on a realistic as­
sessment of United States interest in the Near East, and its 
growing naval hegemony in the Mediterranean. From the time 
of Greek liberation, the United States had contributed approx­
imately $435,500,000 to Greece. In addition to this aid, Sec­
retary of State James Byrnes, had agreed to continued aid to 
Greece in his conversations with British Foreign Minister
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3Ernest Bevin in October 1946. Two additional factors influ­
enced the decision to request Greek aid and fill the breach 
created by British withdrawal: the need for economic aid to 
bolster Europe’s economy, and a desire to formalize an anti- 
Soviet policy.
In a State Department memorandum dated February 26, 
1947, Joseph Jones referred to the economic crisis in France, 
China, Greece and the British Empire. Imminent economic col­
lapse would cause these countries to adopt "independent nation­
alistic" policies or "swing into the Russian orbit." Finan­
cially isolated, the United States would then suffer economic 
depression, and excessive taxation. Jones felt Congress and
the public were unaware of the implications involved in failing
4to rebuild friendly nations’ economies. No reference to a 
fear of spreading communism is found in this statement of 
economic realities; aid must be immediate or United States 
markets will disappear. Jones was advocating haste, but not
3
Barnett., Intervention and Revolution, p. 114; Xydis, 
Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 407, 476; Harold L. Ickes, 
"Truman Accused of Withholding Greek Aid Issue Till Last Min­
ute," Washington Evening Star. April 2, 1947; Thomas L. Stokes, 
"Moral Force Dormant? " Washington News, March 20, 1.947; for 
U. S. Financial contributions, see New York Times. March 21, 
1947, all in the Democratic National Committee Clipping File; 
(Hereinafter cited as Democratic Committee File).
^Memorandum for the File, Jones to Benton, Joseph M. 
Jones Papers, February 26, 1947; (Hereinafter cited as Jones 
Papers); Truman Library, all unpublished material is located 
Harry S. Truman Library (Independence, Missouri, and will 
hereinafter be cited by description only).
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to preserve the existing Greek government. However, such 
economic emphasis disappeared in his book, The Fifteen Weeks, 
which dealt with the background of the Truman request for 
Greek aid. Jones emphasized postwar disagreements with the 
Soviet Union, and a Greece threatened by communism.^
Official interest in announcing an anti-Soviet policy 
is reflected in Presidential aide George Elsey's letter to 
Clark Clifford on March 7. Elsey recommended delaying the 
President's proposal. Greece did not warrant immediate atten­
tion, and action might affect the forthcoming Moscow Foreign 
Ministers Conference. In addition, time must be had to insure 
a receptive public, but of greater importance, in Elsey's 
view, wass "There has been no overt action in the immediate 
past by the U.S.S.R. which serves a,s an adequate pretext for 
the 'All-Out' speech."^ The expression "All-Out speech" is 
not explained, suggesting that Elsey and Clifford had previ­
ously discussed and agreed on the need for such a speech 
defining policy toward the Soviet Union.
State Department officials worked with feverish haste,
Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 11, 135. For texts that 
find economic motivation for the Truman plan,see William Apple- 
man Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy rev. and enl. 
(New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc. , 1962 ) , pp. 269-70. Wood- 
house charges American interest in southern Europe was for 
the purpose of a "bridgehead for northern expansion of eco­
nomic imperialism," ; , Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 289#
^Letter, Elsey to Clifford, Clifford Files, March 7,
1947.
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not entirely due to the international situation, to prepare 
a speech to be given before a joint session of Congress. In 
his memoirs, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, remarked: 
"Everyone knew that the State Department was facing its last 
clear chance to get a job done."^ Jones, who wrote the ac­
cepted speech draft, also conveyed a personal commitment to 
place the State Department in the center of the decision
g
making process. These men were working to regain a pre­
eminence the Department had lost during the Roosevelt Admin­
istration, when its duties were relegated to White House
9aides, military chiefs, and President Roosevelt's decisions. 
The resulting request conveyed a sense pf crisis in inter­
national affair s , but the record also indicates a corresponding 
sense of crisis in professional careers of the involved offi­
cials. Converging self and national interest, and suspicions 
of the Soviet Union resulted in acceptance of a definitive 
policy by Secretary of the Navy Forresta.1, Secretary of War 
Robert P. Patterson, as well as White House and State Depart-
Dean. Acheson, Present At The Creation: My Years in 
The State Department (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc.,
1969), p~. 2zO; (Hereinaf ter cited as Acheson, Present At The 
Creation.
O
Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 147.
9Lisle A. Rose, Dubious Victory: The United States
and the End of World War II (Oberlin: The Kent State Univer­
sity Press, 1973), pp^ 245-47.
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ment executives.^ Convincing Congress and the American peo­
ple remained the only obstacle.
The problems of Greece and the spread of communism 
dominated the President's request on March 12,1947, to grant 
aid. Greek conditions were expressed in broad terms: "There 
is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn," and 
"assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free 
nation."^ These generalities cloaked undemocratic institu­
tions, and neglected to explore previous Greek failure to 
utilize aid. The statement avoids specifics, but there are 
obvious contradictions. In reference to the civil war, Truman 
stated : "The Greek government is unable to cope with the sit­
uation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped" and in
danger of a "totalitarian" system being established by "aggres-
12sive"external "movements." (Aid critic Senator Glen H. 
Taylor would charge that Truman's implication of outside pres­
sure on a poorly equipped Greek army was subterfuge. Taylor 
maintained the 13,000 guerrillas had but scant assistance from 
neighboring countries, and that in addition the Greek army
^For further information why Geeek-Turkish aid gained 
acceptance,see Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America.
1945-1955 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 57-62 ? (Here- 
inafter cited as Goldman, Crucial Decade).
^"Text of President Truman's Speech on New Foreign 
Policy," The New York Times. March 13, 1947, in the Jones Pa­
pers? (Hereinafter cited as "Truman Speech'.').
12Ibid.
consisted of 120,000 troops aided by 10,000 British.)}'*
Introducing the inevitability of an ideological clash, 
Truman's speech continued * "every nation must choose between 
alternative ways of life. " Further implying that if the choice 
were left to chance, peace would be threatened, and also "the 
security of the United States," thus linking aid to. peace and 
national security. This causative pyramid continued with the 
introduction of Turkish aid. Were Greece to succumb, "the 
effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and seri­
ous. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the 
entire Middle East."^ The tone of the speech is crisis 
oriented. Britain's role in Greece, the United Nations, Greek 
politics, and even the request for Turkish aid are under­
emphasized. Barely mentioned is the issue of military per­
sonnel and assistance. These omissions were considered nec­
essary to win public approval and legislation to implement 
15the request.
American press coverage illustrated mixed European
reaction to Truman's proposal; such conflicting headlines as 
—
F. Ross Peterson, Prophet Without Honourt Glen H. 
Taylor and The Fight for American Liberalism (Lexingtoni The 
. University Press of Kentucky, 1974), 88".
^"Truman Speech."
^^Thomas G . Paterson, Soviet American Confrontation: 
Postwar Reconstruction and The Origins of the Cold War (Bal­
timore j Hohn Hopkins University Press , 1.973 ) , p~, 1 97 ; (Here­
inafter cited as 'Paterson, Soviet American Confrontation); 
Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 163, 168.
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"London Gratified By New U.S. Stand," and "Trumans Speech 
Leaves Britons Gaping" made simultaneous appearance. Fearing 
Soviet-American confrontation, British officials were quoted 
as shocked at unexpected military aid to Greece. The conser­
vative Times (London) typically interpreted the speech as an 
attack on communism and a radically new foreign policy, while 
Greek "pledges" to preserve domestic civil liberties were 
recommended in the pro-labor Daily Herald. From Paris, Amer­
ican journalist Harold Callender reported French officials 
were surprised at a plan to extend American "frontiers" to 
the accepted British sphere in the Mediterranean. Speculating 
on Russian reaction, French officials expected a new Soviet 
"line," disrupting the French Communist party cooperation; 
while Swedish press reports feared world polarization and 
possible military conflict. A Soviet Tass dispatch charged 
suppression of Greek democracy, but failed to find the policy 
Soviet-directed. Speculation and amazement summarize known 
European feelings.^^
Two days prior to Truman’s speech of March 12, the 
New York Times had speculated that Congress Would not act to
^  "London Gratif ied By New U .S . Stand, " New York Times . 
March 13, 1947; "Truman Speech Leaves Britons Gaping," Wash­
ington Daily News. March 13,1947; "Europe is Amazed By Blunt 
Warning," New York Times. March 13, 1947; Harold Callender, 
"French See Perils In New U.S. Policy," New York Times. March 
14, 1947; "Scandinavia Aroused: Truman Speech Seen Harmful
to East-West Relations," New York Times. March 14, 1947; "Mos­
cow Sees Aim To 'Control' Greece," New York Times. March 14, 
1947; all in Jones Papers.
31
establish an American "frontier" in royalist Greece or appro- 
priate funds to aid the British Empire.^ Subsequent argu­
ments against the Truman Doctrine included these points, but 
debate centered on the bypassing of the United Nations and the 
Soviet Union's intentions in Europe. The speech did not men­
tion the Soviet Union by name and thus only indirectly alluded
18to that nation's intentions. Yet, an examination of March 
news releases filed in the Truman Papers, Truman Library, in­
dicates that the issue of United Nations and Soviet inten-
19tions dominated public response.
A consensus of radio comments following Truman's dec­
laration interpreted the speech as a new United States policy 
to contain the Soviet Union. Among those finding the plan a 
challenge to Soviet eff ort for world leadership were Leif Eid, 
NBC j Gabriel Heatter and Albert Warner , MBS ; John Daly , Winston 
Burdette, and Eric Sevried of CBS,* and Earl Godwin of ABC. 
Initial radio reports practically ignored the Greek political 
situation and the United Nations. Exceptions were Elmer Davis,
•^New York Times. March 10, 1947, in the Democratic 
Committee File.
^"Truman Speech"
1 9Office of Government Reports: Division of Press
Intelligence. Radio, editorial and column comment concerning 
Truman's Speech were tabulated daily based on major network 
and key newspapers selected for evaluation, located in the 
Conway Files. (Hereinaf ter cited as "Radio Comment, " Editorial 
Comment" or "Column Comment" with appropriate date; see Ap­
pendix A and B for newspapers and columns surveyed.)
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who stressed Greek corruption; Cecil Brown and Ray Henle, who
called for United Nations action and questioned America's
ability to bear the cost if aid were extended to other coun- 
20tries. Opinion extremes are found in comparing the views
of Lowell Thomas and Henry Wallace. Thomas described the
21speech as an attempt "to save the American way." Former 
Vice President Wallace, commenting on NBC, denounced uni­
lateral action to aid a corrupt monarchy as a "betraying" of 
the American "tradition," and suggested that United States
aid to reactionary governments would force liberal people to
22reject such democracy and turn to communism.
During March, radio comments became increasingly crit­
ical. Winston Burdette raised the issue of ideological con­
flict, cautioning that preoccupation with communism would
23counter opposition to fascism. Yet the main issues remained; 
speculation as to Congressional approval , United Nations rather 
than unilateral action, possible war with the Soviet Union, 
and the nature of the Greek government. Reports of early Con­
gressional approval were dimmed by the United Nations issue.
 __
"Radio Comment," March 12, 1947; March 13, 1947.
^Lowell Thomas, N.B.C., "Radio Comment," March 12,
1947.
22Henry A. Wallace, N.B.C., "Radio Comment," March
13, 1947.
23Winston Burdette, C.B.S., "Radio Comment," March
14, 1947.
83
Dissenting views of Senators Claude Pepper and Glen H. Taylor 
centered on bypassing the United Nations. Pepper found con­
tradiction in the offering of funds to Greece and Turkey,
while at the same time maintaining a United Nations which was
24financially unable to act. In an interview on Radio Forum 
of The Air, Taylor insisted no crisis existed, and the sit­
uation called for United Nations action, not United States 
25intervention. Countering these arguments were commentators
such as Fulton Lewis Jr. and Wellman Heilman who maintained that
the United Nations was ineffectual, and felt implementing aid
2 6to threatened nations would strengthen world unity. Drew
Pearson proved the chief Greek critic among radio commentators
charging political corruption and accusing White House aide
General Harry Vaughn of removing from White House files records
damaging to George II. According to Pearson, Arabian oil
27accounted for United States intervention. In reference to 
criticism, Martin Agronsky reported: "Those who criticize are 
automatically labeled wild-eyed dreamers, Wallace school lib-
^"Radio Comment," March 13 through March 31, 1947; 
Claude Pepper, "Radio Comment," March 13, 1947.
7 5Glenn H. Taylor , M.B.S., "American Forum of The Air," 
"Radio Comment," March 20, 1947.
7
Fulton. Lewis, Jr., M.B.S., "Radio Comment," March 
28, 1947; Wellman Heilman,M.B.S., "Radio Comment," March 31,
1 94 7,
27Drew Pearson, A.B.C., "Radio Comment," March 17,
1947, March 24, 1947.
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erals, or just plain communists."
Similar considerations were raised in March editorials
which approved immediate Congressional passage of the Truman
plan. Favorable editorial comments ranged from the Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette. which advocated aid to stabilize the Middle
East only in the event that the United Nations could not act,
to the extreme position of the Philadelphia Inquirer which
asked Americans to choose between "Godless communism" or "gen-
29uine democracy." Dissent followed a similar pattern. The
San Francisco Chronicle asked for sufficient time to consider
ail alternatives and implications, while the communist New
York Daily Worker charged Truman "wiped his feet" on Roose-
30velt's attempt to create an American-Soviet alliance.
During March, more editorials than either radio commentors
or columnists continued to approve the Truman plan. Table IV
compares key newspaper editorials, by region, registering
31support or opposition.
' 1
Martin Agronsky, A.B.C., "Radio Comment," March 17,
1947.
29 "Editorial Comment," Pittsburgh Post Gazette. March 
21, 1947; "Editorial Comment," Philadelphia Inquirer. March 
17. 1947.
30 "Editorial Comment," San Francisco Chronicle . March 
24, 1947; "Editorial Comment," Daily Worker. March 17, 1947.
31 "Editorial Comment," evaluation from March 13, 1947 
to March 3.1, 1 947 .
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T A B L E  IV
REGIONAL EDITORIAL OPINION 
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID; MARCH 13-31, 1947
AREA NUMBER EVALUATED FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE
Washington, D.C. 2 2 0
North East 17 13 4
North Central 9 6 3
Middle West 8 5 3
South 13 9 4
West 10 9 1
TOTAL 59(100%) 44(75%). 15(25%)
Four black papers were also surveyed and were unani­
mously opposed to any type of foreign aid. W.E.B. DuBois in 
the Chicago Defender expressed apprehension that America would 
grew increasingly militaristic. The Baltimore Afro-American, 
the Pittsburgh Courier and the New York Amsterdam Star News 
questioned aid to Greece at a time when American health care, 
education, and housing needed support. These papers further 
suggested money might better be spent to improve the American 
electoral process. Domestic need, bypassing the United Na­
tions, and provoking war with the Soviet Union were key issues
86
32m  these representative papers.
Columnist opinion divided almost evenly over the new 
policy. Syndicated columnists Walter Lippmann, Eleanor Roose­
velt, Arthur Krock and Thomas L. Stokes counseled delay or 
caution against implementation. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, 
writing for the New York PM, was a constant critic, as was 
New York Herald Tribune columnist William L. Shirer, but less 
well known columnists also attacked the Truman plan. John W. 
Owens foresaw a world divided into two hostile camps and even­
tual Soviet-American military confrontation. Clif Stratton 
charged the United States sought to preserve an Empire no 
longer of interest to the British, while George Rothwell
Brown questioned the government's creating a crisis situation
33to achieve approval. Supporting columnists ran the gamut 
from Dorothy Thompson's plea for European regeneration based 
on a "supreme act of conversion on the part of the United 
States," to Sylvia F. Porter's claim that economic aid would 
provide American employment. Acquiescence often paralleled 
Hamilton Butler's conclusion that although painful, the United
o y
"Editorial Comment," Negro Weeklies , March 14, 1947/ 
March 15, 1947-; March 21, 1947.
33
"Column Comment," March 13, 1947 through March 31, 
1947; for a leading columnist's criticisms,.see also Walter Lipp­
mann , The Cold War: A Study in United States Foreign Policy, 
introduction by Ronald Steel (New York: Harper and Row Pub- 
lishers, 1972), pp. 5-52.
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States could not escape a world role. As Table V indicates,
column reading Americans faced a dif ficult choice in evaluating
35conflicting opinions.
TABLE V 
REGIONAL COLUMN COMMENT
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID* MARCH 13-31 , 1947“
AREA TOTAL FAVORABLE
Newspaper
Columnist
UNFAVORABLE
Newspaper
Columnist
AMBIVALENT
Newspaper
Columnist
Washington, 
D. C. 9/19 4/6 2/5 3/8
North East 13/22 5/9 7/12 1/1
North Central . 6/9 3/4 2/4 1/1
Middle West 2/3 0/0 2/3 0/0
South 3/3 3/3 0/0 0/0
West 2/2 0/0 i/i 1/1
TOTAL 35/58(100%) 15/22(3 8%) 14/25(43%) 6/11(19%)
*As a newspaper carries several bylines, the number
of newspapers precedes, the number of columnists.
n /
"Column Comment,” March 15,1947; Dorothy Thompson, 
"Cblumn Comment,” Washington Star. March 14, 1947.
3 5"Column Comment,” evaluation from March 13, 1947 
through March 31, 1947.
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On March 15, the New York Herald Tribune reported the
White House received over twelve hundred messages registering
36"overwhelming approval" for Truman's speech. Only sixty-six
letters and telegrams were retained concerning aid to Greece
and Turkey for the period March through May 1947. Assuming
these messages are representative, "overwhelming approval" is
an overstatement; thirty-three approved, twenty-six objected,
37and seven were ambivalent. Greek corruption and an effective 
United Nations were frequently discussed, but Wallace’s influ­
ence as a major policy critic was obvious. Correspondents ex­
pressing approval cited dislike for Wallace as sufficient rea­
son, while those rejecting the President's plan exclaimed, "Thank
3 8God for Henry A. Wallace. " Greek American societies approved, 
except the American Council for a Democratic Greece, which 
was joined in opposition by divergent groups such as the 
National Farmers Union and the United Christian Missionary 
Society: Diciples of Christ. Ambivalent messages requested
^ New York Herald Tribune. March 15, 1947 in the Dem­
ocratic Committee File.
~^OFF 426, "Aid to Greece and Turkey," OF 1170, 
Wallace File.
3 8 'Letter Muriel Rutinan to Truman, OF 1170, March 
14, 1947; on Wallace's opposition to Greek-Turkish aid,see 
Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond The New Deal: Harry S. Truman and
American L i b e r a l i s m (New York: Columbia University Press,
1973), p5 192, T97. Wallaces speeches against the Truman 
Doctrine provoked an anti-Wallace response, see Norman D. 
Markowitz, The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry 
A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941-1948 (New York: The 
Free Press, 1973J), pp. 225-26, 23 5-41. “
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economic aid, but denounced military assistance. Those mes­
sages mentioning communism are insignif icant. Table VI illus-
39trates the division m  attitude. These evaluated figures
concerning correspondence prove a poor substitute for feelings
expressed similar to those of Evangelos Halikiopoulos, who
wrote describing the pathetic plight of the Greek people and
thanked "the American people for the great a i d . P l e d g i n g  .
support while taki ng a dif f erent tone, B. R. Williams suggested
Truman might quell criticism were he "to publicly castigate
41that Sonofabitch Wallace. " Disapproval also invoked extreme 
prose, one message charging "double-talk," compared Truman to 
a "comedian" and further declared "the Greek people aren’t 
free except to starve and pay taxes." Opposition embraced 
both conservative and liberal Americans; liberals objected 
to unilateral action, while conservatives attacked cost. H. 
M. Meyer summarized right wing opposition; "We are asked to
3 9Correspondence concerning Greece is, located OF 426, 
"Aid to Greece and Turkey," OF 1170, Wallace File.
^Letter, Evangelos * Halikiopoulos to Truman, OF 426, 
May 19, 1947.
^Letter, B. R. Williams to Truman, OF 1170, April 
24, 1947.
^Letter, Marcelle Shubert to Truman, OF 426, April 
13, 1947.
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T A B L E  VI
OPINION EXPRESSED IN WHITE HOUSE MAI& 
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID: MARCH-MAY 1947
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE AMBIVALENT
Humanitarian 6 Neglected United 10 
Nations and fav­
ored Wallace
Economic aid; 
no military
5
Opposition to 
Wallace
3 Greek corruption 8
Plan would en­
courage peace
2 Domestic need 3
Good for trade 1 Cost 3 Provided Greek 
government 
improved
2
Unqualified
approval
21 Endanger peace 2
Individuals 30 Individuals 21 Individuals 7
Organizations
AHEPA
Greek Orthodox 
Church 
Adelphotis Arah 
ovition/Karyae
3 Organizations 5
Congress of 
American 
Women 
National 
Farmers 
Union 
American Council 
For a Democratic 
Greece 
United Christian 
Missionary Soc­
iety : Disciple 
of Christ
TOTAL: 33(50%) 26(39%) 7(11%)
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send our money to another sink hole--Greece." Admittedly 
overstated, the pathos and passion of these letters 
reflected the issues that confronted America.
White House assistant press secretary Eben Ayers de­
scribed dissenting mail originating in New York and Brooklyn
44as clearly inspired" and "propaganda." An article appearing 
in the New York Herald Tribune, entitled "Red Tinge Seen in 
the White House Mail on Truman," interpreted Ayer*s remarks 
as Inferring that communist sympathies inspired opposition. 
Explaining that a difference exists between spontaneous ex­
pression and pressure mail, the article suggested that names 
be published to distinguish those who write "to follow a 
1 line.1
Also written from New York was a letter from Eleanor
Roosevelt. This message to Truman objected to an ideological
crusade and stated:
. . . I do not believe that the Democratic party can win
by going the Republican party one better in conservatism 
on the home front. Nor do I believe that taking over 
Mr. Churchill's policies in the Near East, in the name 
of democracy -is the way to really create a barrier to
Letter, H. M. Meyer to Truman, OF 426, April 7, 1947. 
On critics see Paterson, Soviet American Confrontation, p.
201; see also Walter Lippmann, "Seeing it Through," Washington 
Post, March 15, 1947.
^Eben Ayers as quoted by Bert Andrews, "Red Tinge 
Seen In White House Mail on Truman," New York Herald Tribune, 
March 15, 1947 in the Democratic Committee File.
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communism or promote democracy. . . .  46
Recent Truman critics find an anti-communist stance adopted
by the Democrats in 1947, and explain that this was a result
of the Republican Congressional victory in the 1946 elections.
Communism did serve as an issue in that election, thus, the
charge of Mrs. Roosevelt that the Democratic party did not
need attempt to outdo the Republican party on this issue. ^
A series of opinion polls are included in Joseph
Jones's papers concerning reaction to the Truman Doctrine.
These documents, which are marked "Confidential," and only
were declassified in August 1973, illustrate the Government's
48preoccupation with public response. White House statements 
expressing "overwhelming approval" offer one explanation for 
secrecy. By a "majority of nearly five to three" Americans 
objected to foreign military aid. Seventy-five percent had
4-6Letter, Eleanor Roosevelt to Truman, OF 426, April
7, 1947.
^Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and The Crisis Presi­
dency (Ifew York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973), p. 186 ; David 
Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American 
Foreign PplTcy in the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang. 1 965) , 
pp. 99-100.
48Memorandum for the File? Department of State, Di­
vision of Public Studies, '"Evaluation of the Current Opinion 
Situation on Greek-Turkish Problem," March 27, 1947y U. S. 
Public Opinion on President Truman's Proposals for Aid to 
Greece and Turkey, March 12-March 17; (Hereinafter cited as 
"Public Opinion";; Memorandum for the File, "Confidential 
Gallup Results: Greece and Turkey," March 27, 1947, in the 
Jones Papers.
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knowledge of Truman's proposal, but interpreted the plan as
economic aid to a Soviet and communist-threatened Greece; in
addition, more than "two to one" believed the United Nations
should resolve the problem. These polls indicate that press,
radio, and influential political leaders supported the Truman 
49plan. As previously stated, this study found press and
radio responses were actually divided on this issue, excepting 
editorial comment which remained favorable. Based on legis­
lators! initial public remarks , Congress did not spontaneously 
approve the Greek-Turkish aid plan. Of seventy-five inter­
viewed by the media twenty-seven approved, twenty-two dis­
approved, and twenty-six either refused comment or suggested 
alternatives (eighteen congressmen made no comment; eight 
offered objections to such provisions as military aid) . Jones, 
reporting in The Fifteen Weeks, stated that thirty-five con­
gressmen "indicated support." He has added those con­
gressmen who qualified their support to those who completely
supported the m e a s u r e E v i d e n c e  based on government doc-
¥
uments, newspaper files, and correspondence suggest that both
49Memorandum for the File; Department of State, Di­
vision of Public Studies, "Confidential Gallup Results: 
Greece and Tur-key," March 27, 1947, "Public Opinion," Jones 
Papers.
“^ "Congressional Statements on President Truman’s 
Address Asking Aid For Greece and Turkey," March 12, 1947, 
March 14, 1947, "Public Opinion," pp. 1-20, Jones Papers; 
Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 173-74; 'Truman’s Plan for Greece 
Gets Mixed Reaction in Congress," Washington Star. March 12, 
1947, Jones Papers.
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Jones and historian Thomas G. Paterson erred in assuming wide­
spread support for the Truman proposal. Paterson stated:
With business, labor, and newspaper support, with a Gal­
lop poll shortly after the president' s speech indicating 
that about seventy-five percent of the population had 
heard of the aid program and that most applauded it, the 
bill passed. . . .  51
In March 1947, most Americans reacted with alarm and confusion 
to Truman's speech. Ambiguous and crisis-oriented, it achieved 
undeserved success. Government officials hastened legisla­
tive action, as congressmen and ordinary citizens expressed 
reservations or failed to understand the implications. Suf­
ficient time and knowledge may have altered the course.
On April 22, the bill implementing aid to Greece and 
Turkey easily passed the Senate by a vote of sixty-seven to 
twenty-three. Sponsorship by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg 
and the issue of communism facilitated passage. Conserva­
tive Republican Vandenberg perceived "Communism on- the-march, "
52and felt the Truman plan represented the "lesser of evils." 
Compromising on the United Nations issue, Vandenberg sponsored 
provisions which suggested eventual United Nations participa-
51
Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 173-74; Paterson, Soviet 
American Conf rontation, p~, 201 ; also assuming public approval 
see Goldman, Crucial Decade, p. 60.
52Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of 
Senator Vandenberg;. ed. with Jo Alex Morris (Boston: Hough- 
ton Mifflin Co., 1952), pp. 342-43; (Hereinafter cited as 
Vandenberg Papers).
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53tion.
Leading Senate critics were Senators Robert Taft, 
Claude Pepper, and Glen H. Taylor who objected because they 
felt the plan might lead to Soviet-American war, and that uni­
lateral action threatened the United Nations. A less known 
critic, Senator Albert W. Hawkes of New Jersey, raised the 
issue of the absence of public support. Hawkes claimed Con­
gressional mail proved "Americans do not understand" the is­
sues. Yet, these objections were overridden by a Senate
majority which became convinced that the Soviet Union and com­
munism threatened the Mediterranean and this in turn threatened
c:/:
the United States.
Following the Senate's lead, the House approved the 
bill on May 9 by a 180 vote margin. Francis Case presided as 
House Chairman of the Committee which considered the Greek
53Vandenberg Papers, pp. 345-46; New York Times. April 
23,1947 in the Democratic Committee File.
54Henry W . Berger, "Senator Robert A. Taft Dissents 
from Military Esculation," in Thomas G. Paterson, ed.. Cold 
War Critics; Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in The 
Truman Years (Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 1971), pp. 167-95; 
(Hereinafter cited as Paterson, Cold War Critics); Thomas
G. Paterson, "The Dissent of Senator Claude Pepper,"pp. 114- 
34; William C. Pratt, "Senator Glen H. Taylor" Questioning 
American Unilateralism," pp. 140-61.
55 "Vandenberg Hits at Critics of Greek Aid," Wash­
ington Post, April 9, 1947, in Democratic Committee File.
"^Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Bipartisan Foreign Policy : Myth 
or Reality? (New York: Row, Peterson and Co. 1957), p. 68.
For anti-communist hysteria, see Lisle A. Rose, After Yalta. 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), pp. 181-85.
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aid bill. Discounting communism,Francis Case, a Republican
of South Dakota, explained in a letter to Truman that House
acceptance rested on two provisions: that the Greek and
Turkish, governments consented, and the United Nations could
57invalidate aid at will. Middle East oil motivated some
votes, as did conflicting desires for peace or war, but Case 
made it obvious that "support was reluctant." Summarizing his 
feelings, Case defined the measure as "stop-gap," adding 
"The people of the United States are weary of 'government by 
crisis.' Every man must realize that no country . . . , is
wise enough or rich enough.or just plain big enough to run
rr o
the rest of the world."
Greece became an uneasy testing ground for the new 
United States foreign policy. Revealing disillusionment, 
Truman recalled in his Memoirs that "even as we undertook to 
bolster the economy of Greece . . .  we were faced with her 
desire to use our aid to further partisan political, rather
57Letter, Francis Case to Truman, OF 426, May 10, 
1947. Greek aid requests originated in the United States 
Department of State, see Acheson, Present at the Creation, 
p. 221. Acheson describes the United Nations provision as 
"window dressing," ibid., p. 224; on legislative passage,see 
U. S. Congress, Senate, 80th Cong. 1st sess., April-May, 
1947, Congressional Record. XCIII, 3758-3793; U.S., Congress, 
House, 80th Cong., 1st sess., April-May, 1947, Congressional 
Record. XCIII, 4908-4975.
58Francis Case to Truman. Case discusses oil and 
peace and war motives. On war hysteria see,"'Some Congress­
men Advocate Immediate War With Russia,'" Omaha World Herald. 
March 13, 1947, p. 1.
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59than national aims.” From 1947 to 1949, despite gigantic 
United States expenditures, Greek officials failed to elimi­
nate tax evasion, black marketeering, or repressive measures.^ 
The Truman files contain many messages asserting suppression 
of the Greek labor movement, arrests, executions, and corrup­
tion. Government officials, labor organizations, Jewish fra­
ternities, and ordinary citizens joined earlier Truman Doc-
61trine critics in protest. Preoccupied with Greek civil 
strife, the American Mission failed to take effective mea­
sures.
Proving a Sad commentary on efforts to aid "democratic
Greece,” United States officials joined royalists in purging
6 2press, strikes, and the KKE. Commenting on these events 
in February 194 8, Congressman George Bender, Republican of Ohio, 
wrote Truman expressing "revulsion” at "atrocities” committed
59Truman, Years of Trial, p. 109.
6 0Total military and economic aid was $7 58,655,056.63 
from March 1947 to March 1949. These calculations are based 
on stated figures in "Status of Appropriation Under Public Laws 
271 and 793, 80th Congress, as of March 31, 1949,” OF 206-M,
Box 778. On misuse of funds see also ”U. S. Wasting Aid on 
Greece Report Revealed,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 7, 1949. 
This article refers to a report on Greece "suppressed by 
Democratic leaders,” Democratic Committee File. Also critical 
see "Memorandum for the Files Regarding Greek Conditions,”
OF 426, Box 1278, July 17, 194 7.
^Correspondence concerning Greece may be found 
OF 426, OF 206-M, Box 1278.
^O'Ballance, Greek Civil War, p. 155.
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63in the presence of American military. Conditions remained 
unchanged and United States efforts at supervision were an­
swered by claims from the Greek left and right of American
A
intervention in the internal affairs of Greece. Investi­
gating the Greek situation, CBS correspondent George Polk was 
murdered in May 1948. His death occasioned charges and coun­
tercharges in the’ American press. Columnist Drew Pearson
claimed that right wing terrorists murdefed Polk, while Greek
65courts convicted leftist guerrillas. The United States, as 
Britain, was unable to alter internal conditions or the nature 
of the Greek government. By Octoberr 1949, the Greek army 
with American military assistance successfully defeated the 
leftist insurgents and the civil war was over. Succeeding 
governments proved increasingly right wing and repressive un­
til George Papandreou appeared liberal in comparison. Maurice 
Goldbloom wrote of the Papandreou premiership of the mid-1 960* s 
that "Greeks were f reer under the Papandreou government than
^Letter, George II. Bender to Truman, Of 206-M, Feb­
ruary 17, 1948.
^Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, p. 28.
^Drew Pearson, "Dead Men Tell No Tales in Greece," 
Washington Post, May 22, 1948; "Lippmann Heads Group to Probe 
Death of Polk," Washington Post. May 22, 1948; "Newsmen In­
quire Into Polk Slaying," New York Times t May 22, 1948; "Greek 
Gets Life in Polk Slaying, Salonika Trial is Pronounced Fair," 
New York Times. April 22, 1949; Democratic Committee File. 
Harry Martin, President American Newspaper Guild, wrote Pres­
ident Truman requesting Polk's deatn be investigated; Harry 
Martin to Truman, OF 206-M, Kay 29, 1948.
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they had been at any previous time." On April 21, 1967, a 
right wing coup led to a Metaxas-style dictatorship under 
George Papadopoulos. This regime remained in power for over 
six years, giving way to another dictatorship, under the 
leadership of Dimitrios Ioannidis. Dictatorial government 
ended when Constantine Karamanlis, right wing Greek Premier 
from 1955 to 1963, was invited to form a new government. 
Karamanlis recently won a parliamentary majority in the first 
elections held in ten years. ^
Had the Greeks been left to settle their own affairs 
from 1944 to 194 7, it is likely that a native communist govern­
ment similar to that of Yugoslavia would have been created.
The Karamanlis government now faces a curious dilemma. As 
has been seen, the "Megali Idea" of territorial achievement 
had tremendous emotional appeal to Greeks. During the 
decade of the 1950s, the conflict over "Enosis" or union with 
Cyprus almost severed friendly relations between the right 
wing Greek government and its former benefactor, Britain.
Cyprus is again an issue and it will be interesting to see if 
the Karamanlis government feels itself strong enough to cut
^Maurice Goldbloom. "What Happened in Greece," Com­
mentary , XLIV (December 1967;, p. 71.
^For accounts of Greek politics since 1946 and 
the American maintenance of a Greek right wing government, see 
also Maurice Goldbloom, "What Happened in Greece," pp. 68-74; 
"Greece, The Colonel Musters Out," Time, Vol. 104 (November 4,
1974), p. 42.
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United States aid and support, and if it does so, how long it 
can retain power.
C H A P T E R  V
CONCLUSION
During the years 1944 to 1947, first Britain and then 
the United States intervened in the political affairs of 
Greece. Complex motivation of national and personal interest 
resulted in Anglo-American leaders initiating policies con­
trary to views accepted by many Americans. Initial British 
intervention in 1944 violated the Atlantic Charter of 1941 
which announced the principle of self-determination for lib­
erated nations. Unilateral action of the United States in 
1947 usurped a possible United Nations role. Many Americans, 
when conf ronted with postwar Anglo-American involvement in the 
Mediterranean, reacted with concern and dismay. White House 
correspondence supported by opinion polls for the period pro­
vide evidence of public interest and concern. These documents 
indicate Americans were prepared to accept a far different 
postwar world than national rivalries in Greece, supported by 
Anglo-American policies, helped create.
Presidential correspondence and polls reflect the 
views of a small number of concerned individuals and organiza­
tions . Assuming that these views are representative of those 
Americans knowledgeable of foreign affairs, sentiment in 1944 
and 1945 supported the EAM nationalist movement. Paralleling 
the views found in White House mail are those of press corre-
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spondents such as George Weller, Richard Mowrer, Leland Stowe 
and Howard K. Smith, as well as the historical research of L. 
S. Stavrianos. These sources suggest that there might be 
evidence that Britain in its battle against the EAM f ollowing 
World War II repressed a majority effort on the part of the 
Greek people to create representative government. Stavrianos 
charges that histories which present Churchill's policies as 
furthering liberty in postwar Greece should be evaluated as 
the result of "cold war mythology."^ Historical interpreta­
tion based on royalist sympathies or national interest fail
to cloud the record when viewed through the perspective of
2
White House correspondence. Messages and telegrams almost 
unanimously condemned British policy, and praised the former 
resistance fighters, the EAM/ELAS.
What is of ten termed national policy is more often the
3policy of a very few men. Americans writing Roosevelt re-
L. S. Stavrianos, "Greece's Other History," p. 12; 
for a similar conclusion see ToddGitlin, "Counter-Insurgency; 
Myth and Reality in Greece," in Containment and Revolution, 
ed. David Horowitz (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 140-81.
2
For an example of a history reflecting monarchist 
sympathy, see Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat; reflecting 
views representing British national interest is Woodward, 
British Foreign Policy; for EAM/ELAS role in Greek libera­
tion, see Eudes, The Kapetanios; for official United States 
policy,see Winif red N. Hadsel, "American Policy Toward Greece , " 
Foreign Policy Reports, XXIII (September 1, 1947), pp. 146- 
60.
^English historian G. D. Clayton warns the student of 
foreign affairs that what is often termed national policy is* 
more of ten the policy of a few national leaders, see Clayton, 
Britain and The Eastern Question, pp. 244-47.
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quested that their President act to curtail the policies of 
Winston Churchill who, in the view of Lord Horan, "seems to 
be alone in his grasp of the danger to the liberty, of the 
Greeks."^1 Churchill was almost "alone" if American correspon­
dence and polls reflected the amount of support generated by 
his nation's actions. Moran, as Churchill1s personal physican, 
referred to the Prime Minister's vacillating moods of first 
conciliation and then antagonism toward Stalin, and found 
Churchill's feelings in regard to communism 'Jan obsession.
Yet Churchill's success in initiating repressive policies 
toward what he believed to be a communist movement in Greece 
cannot be entirely explained by his position of leadership or 
his personal idiosyncrasies. Britairfs historic interest in 
the Mediterranean, resulting from her control of India and 
possessions in the oil rich Middle East, reinforced any res­
ervations Churchill may have had on the desirability of the 
creation of partisan communist governments. In seeking to 
protect Britain's traditional interests, the Prime Minister 
f ailed to recognize or respect an emerging postwar democratic 
movement.
Roosevelt failed to act to prevent the implementa­
tion of Churchill's Mediterranean policies. In answer to
^C. M. Moran, Churchill Taken From the Diaries of Lord 
Moran: The Struggle for Survival 1940-1965 (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1966), p ( H e r e i n a f t e r  cited as Moran, Chur­
chill ). *-
^Ibid., pp. 185, 221.
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critical American opinion, he publically declared that self- 
determination for liberated nations was a desired ideal dif­
ficult to implement, and further informed the American peo­
ple that there was no actual Atlantic Charter, but only a 
series of unsigned memoranda sent to Washington and London 
for press release. The Chicago Daily News printed Roosevelt's 
statements which were made at the previous days press con­
ference and in addition the newspaper declared editorially 
that the Charter was unrealistic and an unfortunate display 
of "politicians enraptured by their own rhetoric."^ Presi­
dential correspondence and public opinion polls reflect an 
American public equally "enraptured" by a supposed document 
that they believed supported the right of liberated people to 
choose their own form of government. The consensus of this 
opinion condemned British action, but signif icantly requested 
United States action to counteract British designs. Where 
opinion is evaluated it indicates Americans were unprepared 
for political action which violated principles designed to 
create an effective world organization of cooperating, self- 
governing nations.
A right wing, monarchist government was successfully 
established in Greece. The creation of this government by
^Chicago Daily News. December 20, 1944, p. 5, 10. 
Roosevelt expected an Anglo-Soviet policy creating spheres of 
influence, but indicated slight concern over December events, 
see James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970) , pp. 537-39.
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military force preceded similar action by the Soviet Union 
elsewhere. Stalin readily agreed to Churchill's request of 
October 9, 1944 to divide the Balkans. At that time and in 
the future, Stalin displayed slight interest in the Greek 
nationalist movement led by the EAM. Although Churchill and 
the Greek right labeled the former resistance fighters efforts 
as communist-inspired, Stalin displayed scant interest in the 
EAM or the Greek Communist party. His postwar intentions 
for the remainder of the Balkans are at best surmised, but 
the creation of communist political systems in Rumania and 
Bulgaria followed the British establishment of a right wing
7
Greek government. Prior British policies toward Greece of­
fered Stalin an excuse and pretext for his postwar efforts
8to establish a Soviet hegemony in the Balkans.
From 1945 to 1947, the Soviet Union and the United 
States moved toward an eventual cold war confrontation. The
Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin, trans. by 
Michael B. Petrovich (New York j Harcourt Brace and World, Inc., 
1962), pp. 131-32, 181-82, 114; see also Hugh Seton-Watson, 
The New Imperialism: A Background Book (Totowa,. New Jersey: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1971). Seton-Watson lists Eastern 
European countries to come under Soviet controlled communist 
domination as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungry, Rumania, and 
Bulgaria. This control was effected between 1945 and 1948, 
see ibid.. pp. 78-81; Barnet, Intervention and Revolution; 
Barnet quotes Stalin as saying in April, 1945: "Everyone im­
poses his own system as far as his army can reach," see ibid.. 
p. 102. The British army had been in Greece seven months 
by April 1945.
o
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 420; Bohlen, 
Witness to History, p~ 234.
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origins of this cold war are increasingly reexamined in Amer­
ican historiography, and some historians find that Soviet-American 
conflict was not a result of Soviet imperialism or a desire 
to further communist ideology. These scholars conclude that 
the cold war resulted from American efforts to further United 
States postwar interests, and that the United States and not
the Soviet Union precipated initial conflict, thus polarizing
9the postwar world. However, this study finds British inter­
vention in Greece an equal impetus to the impending cold war 
conflict, because the United States refused to recognize 
Soviet preeminence in Bulgaria and Rumania, while at the same 
time ignoring or supporting British activities in Greece. A 
reassessment of postwar actions is necessary, but one must 
consider initial British unilateral policies, and the effect 
of these policies on subsequent Soviet activities which in 
turn alarmed the American leadership.
Following Roosevelt* s death, Truman and his advisors 
came to' view with alarm the creation of communist governments 
in the Balkans, and further seemed to fail to differentiate 
between the partisan communist governments of Yugoslavia and 
Albania and the Soviet-instigated governments of Rumania and 
Bulgaria. As early as the Potsdam Conference in 1945, Truman 
insisted that free elections be held in the Balkans and con­
demned Soviet policies within those countries. Yet, within
9
Supra, f’n. 43, Chapter I.
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a year, Truman accepted the results of two dubious Greek elec­
tions. At the same time, the Greek government's territorial 
claims in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had international 
repercussions. As Greece aggravated its Balkan neighbors, 
Anglo-American diplomats lent their support; at the same time 
the Soviet Union supported the Balkan governments. Thus,
Balkan politics aided in the deterioration of Soviet-American
i 10relations.
Coupled with simplistic views of communism and national 
divisions created in part by Balkan politics, were economic 
realities. The United States needed international markets at 
a time the European economy threatened collapse. The economic 
drain of World War II and the devastation to agriculture caused 
by the severe weather of 1946-47 rendered the economies of 
Britain and France insignificant as future recipients of Amer­
ican industrial output. In addition the United States Navy 
enjoyed unprecedented growth under Secretary of the Navy James 
Forrestal who recognized that naval hegemony required a con­
stant source of petroleum. Domestic sources of oil were 
unreliable, necessitating use of Middle East supplies which 
in turn required supervision of pipe line termination points 
in the Mediterranean. Further complicating the political sit­
uation was the personal motivation of State Department offi-
gTruman, Harry S. Truman, p. 343; Leahy, I Was There, 
pp. 428-29; Kaiser, Cold Winter, p. 11; supra. fn. 46, Chapter 
III.
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cials whose department loyalties precluded any effort or de­
sire to create an effective world organization that would pre­
empt their importance in policy formation.^ These multiple 
factors from 1945 to 1947 created an explosive political cli­
mate, and suggest the inevitability of a definitive United 
States foreign policy aimed at containing the Soviet Union 
and furthering United States interests.
Simultaneous with worsening Soviet-American relations 
was a change in many Americans* concern for developing Greek 
democracy. Sympathy for liberal elements in Greece was sup­
plemented by support for Greek territorial gains. In 1945 to 
1947, a series of right wing Greek governments promoted the 
ideal of a "Greater Greece” perhaps to distract the Greek 
population from continuing internal economic problems and 
political abuses. As other Balkan countries established com­
munist political systems, the Greek government used fear of 
communism as an additional political crutch. White House cor­
respondence reflects the views of Greek-American societies as 
well as the "Justice For Greece Committee" which distributed 
literature throughout the departments of government in order 
to acquire support for Greek territorial gains. The consider­
able support and sympathy for a "Greater Greece" is evidenced 
in the number of messages located in the Truman files, from
^ Supra, fn. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, Chapter I; fn.. 7, 8, 
9, Chapter IV; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 224; 
Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 9-10.
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judges, postal officials, state and national legislators as
well as such organizations as the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
Sympathy for Greece compounded by fears of Soviet intentions
predisposed prominent Americans as well as obscure individuals
12toward policies which would favor Greece. Equally signifi­
cant were efforts of one ethnic organization, the Greek Amer­
ican Council, to attract Presidential attention to Greece's 
internal political and economic conditions. Representing a 
minority of the White House mail, these messages describe 
the repression of all liberal political elements in Greece 
by a reactionary oligarchy, which used available economic 
assistance to enrich.its adherents and at the same time avoided 
taxation,while levying prohibitive taxes against the remainder 
of the population. The Greek American Council was placed on 
the Attorney General's list of subversive societies and de­
scribed "as having signif icance in connection with the National 
13Security!' A study of the postwar Greek conditions verifies 
the Greek American Council's description of conditions as por­
trayed in the White House mail. Walter Lippmann expressed
The Department of State recognized that Greece had ac­
quired considerable public sympathy. Jones verifies the 
statement made during hearings on the Greek-Turkish aid pro­
posal that "Turkey was slipped into the oven with Greece be­
cause that seemed to be the surest way to cook a tough bird," 
see Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. T62-63.
13Armed Forces Security Questionnaires Organizations 
designated by the Attorney General, pursuant to Executive Order 
104 50."
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similar conclusions in a Washington Post column following 
Truman's request for Greek aid.1^ On the basis of available 
evidence, it is difficult to conclude how these views signified 
a threat to the security of the United States. Perhaps a more 
logical conclusion may be that they represented opinion con­
trary to Anglo-American support of the right wing political 
factions in Greece. Perhaps the Greek American Council being 
listed as a possible subversive society heralded an era of 
coming intolerance for opposing views. Presidential mail for 
the intervening years between Greek liberation and the announce­
ment of the Truman Doctrine illustrates that Greek territorial 
claims and a growing intolerance for opposing views would con­
fuse intelligible evaluation of the true Greek internal sit­
uation when Truman requested economic and military aid to the 
Mediterranean.
In a recent study of the Truman era, historian Robert 
H. Ferrell introduces a valid point concerning historical in­
terpretations of the cold war. In his essay, Ferrell advises 
that historical conclusions regarding the causes of the cold 
war are impossible until such time as the involved nation's re-
Walter Lippmann, ’’Today and Tomorrow," Washington 
Post, April 1, 1947, Democratic Committee File. Lippmann 
stated: "We have selected Turkey and Greece not because they
are specially in need of relief, not because they are shining 
examples of democracy and the Four Freedoms, but because they 
are the strategic gateway to the Black Sea and the heart of 
the Soviet Union. ’’
Ill
cords are available lor complete research and evaluation.^ 
Incorporated in this study are evaluations of Presidential 
correspondence, news releases, and opinion polls located in 
the Truman Papers, Truman Library. Public opinion polls, re­
cently declassified in 1973 and White-House mail refute his­
torical interpretations suggesting Americans were prepared 
for peacetime United States involvement in the internal affairs 
of other nations. Available documents indicate that Truman's 
speech of. March 12, 1947 defining such a policy confused and 
divided American opinion. Many of those supporting aid to 
Greece and Turkey misinterpreted the implication of military 
assistance; others gave reluctant support because the speech 
implied that an unfriendly political system sought Balkan 
domination, and that this in turn endangered the national 
security of the United States.^ Presidential correspondence 
and polls as early as 1945 indicate some American readiness 
for United States unilateral action if Britain or the Soviet
1 5Robert H. Ferrell, "Truman Foreign Policy: A Tradi­
tionalist View," The Truman Period As A Research Field t A Re­
appraisal, 1972, ed. by Richard S. Kirkendall (Columbia • 
Missouri; University of Missouri Press, 1974), pp. 21-22. 
Ferrell also suggests Stalin instigated the cold war for per­
sonal and political motives, see ibid., pp. 26-27.
16 . .Department of State, Division of Public Studies,
Office of Public Affairs, "U. S. Public Opinion on President 
Truman's Proposals for Aid to Greece and Turkey.," March 28,
1947. Summary, point 3 states i "Most support is based oil 
the view that the program put forward by the President is nec­
essary to halt Soviet or communist expansion. -But this course 
is accepted v/ith reluctance or misgiving."
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Union took such action in regard to other nations. By implying 
the Soviet Union planned to dominate Greece and the Darda­
nelles, the Truman plan successfully attracted support, and 
hinted that valid criticism was seemingly unpatriotic.
The Department of State, in its divisions of press 
intelligence and public studies, collected all available in­
formation concerning public response to the Truman speech.
As previously mentioned these documents are contained in the 
Truman files. Included in these files is a confidential mem- 
orandum dated March 16, 1947 and declassified August 9, 1973. 
This memorandum suggests the executive department utilized
all available sources of opinion in order to "sell the pub-
1 7lie" on the Truman Doctrine. In reference to conclusions 
of available public sentiment concerning aid to Greece and 
Turkey the public opinion memorandum states that the "observa­
tions seem pertinent as a background to further information 
activities."^ These "information activities" included press 
releases stressing ideological conflict between communism and 
democracy and also emphasized that the United States must act 
to protect its political future by aiding resistance to com-
Jones uses the phrase "sell the public" reporting 
State Department discussions in Fifteen Weeks, p. 151; see 
also Confidential Memorandum for the file "Evaluation of the 
Current Opinion Situation on the Greek-Turkish Problem"(March 
16, 1947.
1 8"Evaluation of the Current Opinion Situation on the 
Greek-Turkish Problem," March 26, 1947.
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1 9munism in democratic nations. This study found slight rela­
tion in the public reception of the Truman plan and its sub­
sequent adoption. Executive appraisal of public opinion was 
for the purpose of releasing information believed necessary 
to contrive favorable public response. Therefore, in the case 
of aid to Greece and Turkey, public opinion had an insignifi­
cant role in shaping foreign policy. The executive depart­
ment responded to public opinion regarding one issue, that of 
the United Nations. Adverse reaction to the Truman Doctrine 
centered on bypassing the world organization,thus the need for 
provisions implying eventual United Nations participation. 
Realizing that this issue might defeat the Greek-Turkish aid
bill,almost meaningless legislative provisions concerning
20the United Nations were included.
What may be learned from the White House Mail? These 
messages reveal that in the years preceding implementation of 
the Truman plan, Americans were unprepared for the coming cold 
war confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. On the contrary, available opinion indicated a read­
iness to accept future international cooperation based on an
1 9Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 150^53.
20Ibid., pp. 180-81; see also Vandenberg Papers, pp. 
345-46; Acheson, Present at The Creation, p. 224.
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21effective world organization. Unilateral United States 
intervention in Greece resulted from actions taken by policy­
makers and elected officials for a variety of reasons which 
successfully circumvented the apparent public will. Americans 
were prepared to accept the United States initiating policies 
which would strengthen the United Nations, and were also pre­
pared for their government to grant economic assistance to 
nations in actual need. They were not prepared for the real­
ities of postwar "realpolitik" which circumvented the princi­
ples of the Atlantic Charter and an effective world organiza­
tion .
Presidential correspondence included many references
to the EAM and its role in postwar Greece. Research for this
study verifies that portion of White House mail which represented
the EAM as a nationalist movement attempting to create a demo-
22cratic government. British repression of that movement 
which was followed in time by the Truman plan to support "demo­
cracy" led to years of successive right wing governments and
■ 21 . . .Melvin Small arrives at a similar conclusion m  his
recent statement, " . . .  had the Russians been perceived as 
conciliatory, most Americans would have approved," see Small,
"How We Learned to Love the Russians," p. 4 78.
22 The works of L. S. Stavrianos support the view that 
EAM was a nationalist and not international communist-inspired 
movement; see also the record of William Hardy McNeill, post­
war U. S. Assistant Military Attache' in Athens, Greek Dilemma, 
p. 248; McNeill further concluded the Greek right would estab­
lish a dictatorship were its political power threatened by 
the left, see also ibid., p. 271-72.
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scant economic or social gains within Greece. On April 21, 
1967, a military dictatorship paralleling that of 1936 was 
established. When confronted with an apparently successful 
attempt of the Greek left and center political parties to gain 
an elective parliamentary majority, right wing military of­
ficers seized control of the Greek government. As the coup 
forestalled election, it is impossible to know what changes 
may have been wrought. But, just as the formerly British- 
supported George Papandreou was labeled a communist sympathizer
in the years preceding the coup, liberal politicans were
23charged with communism and the elective process halted.
From 1947 to the present, the United States paralleling 
the British policy of 1944 to 1947, has granted aid to a suc­
cession of right wing Greek governments. Faced with right 
wing intransigence which refuses to relinquish political 
perogatives by incorporating a political left or center, the 
United States has been forced to support those political
24parties favoring this natiorfs military presence in Greece. 
Unfortunately*, if the Greek political oligarchy fails to re­
tain power, beneficial results of United States aid may be
* 2_
Stephen Rousseas, with the collaboration of Herman 
Starobin and Gertrud Lenzes, The Death of A Democracy: Greece 
and the American Conscience (New Yorks Grove Press, Inc., 1967), 
pp. 54-70, 73-98; John A. Katris, Eyewitness in Greece; The 
Colonels Come to Power (St. Louis, Missouri: New Critics 
Press, Inc., 1971), pp. 87-107; (Hereinafter cited as Katris, 
Eyewitness in Greece).
2. A Katris, Eyewitness in Greece, pp. 11-16.
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forgotten in the resulting resentment of American support of 
reactionary governments.
A P P E N D I X  A
"EDITORIAL COMMENT” EVALUATED 
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID MARCH 13-31, 1947
FAVORABLE
Albuquerque Journal 
Atlanta Constitution 
Baltimore Sun 
Boise Statesman 
Buffalo Courier-Express 
Burlington Vermont Free Press 
Charleston South Carolina 
News Sc Courier 
Cheyenne Wyoming State Tribune 
Chicago Times 
Christian Science Monitor 
Cincinnati Enquirer 
Cleveland Plain Dealer 
Dallas News 
Des Moines Register 
Denver Post 
Fargo Forum 
Hartford Courant 
Indianapolis Star 
Jacksonville Florida 
Times-Union 
Little Rock Arkansas Gazet 
Louisville Courier-Journal
Manchester New Hampshire Union 
Nashville Tennessean 
Newark News
New Orleans Times-Picayune 
New York Herald Tribune 
New York Mirror 
New York Times 
New York World Herald 
Oklahoma City Oklahoman 
Omaha World-Herald 
Philadelphia Inquirer 
Phoenix Arizona Republic 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
Portland Maine Press Herald 
Portland Oregonian 
Reno Gazette 
Providence Journal 
Salt Lake City Tribune 
St. Louis Post Dispatch 
Sioux Falls Argus-Leader 
Washington Post 
Washington Star 
Wilmington News
UNFAVORABLE
Baltimore Afro-American 
Birmingham Age-Herald 
Chicago Defender 
Chicago Sun 
Chicago Tribune 
Detroit Free Press 
Minneapolis Tribune 
New York Amsterdam Star News
New York Daily Worker 
New York PM
Norfolk Journal and Guide 
Pittsburgh Courier 
Raleigh News and Observer 
Richmond-Times Dispatch 
San Francisco Chronicle
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A P P E N D I X  B
"COLUMN COMMENT" EVALUATED 
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID MARCH 13-31 , 1947
FAVORABLE
Dallas News
Detroit Free Press
Jacksonville Florida 
Times-Union
Minneapolis Tribune
New York Herald Tribune
New York Journal-American
New York Post
New York Times
New York WorId-Telegram
Philadelphia Bulletin
Richmond Times Dispatch 
Washington News 
Washington Post
Washington Star
Washington Times-Herald
Lynn W. Landrum 
Hamilton Butler 
John Temple Graves
Arthur Upgren
George Fielding Eliot
M/Gen. David P. Barrows
Lewis Haney
Merryle S, Rukeyser
Edgar Ansel Mowrer 
Van Devander and Player 
Sylvia F. Porter
Anne O'Hare McCormick
Lawrence Fertig
Dewitt Mackenzie 
Ralph W. Page
Thomas Lomax Hunter
William Philip Simms
Stewart Alsop 
Mark Sullivan
Gould Lincoln 
Dorothy Thompson
Westbrook Pegler
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UNFAVORABLE
Baltimore Sun 
Chicago Sun
Cleveland Plain Dealer
Detroit Free Press
New York Daily Worker
New York Herald Tribune
New York Journal American
New York PM
New York Post
'New York Times
San Francisco Chronicle
Topeka Capital 
Washington News 
Washington Post
John W. Owens
Kenesaw M. Landis II 
Gerry Robichaud
Jay Franklin 
Spencer D. Irwin 
Russell Weismann
Royce Howes
James S. Allen 
Joseph Clark 
Mike Gold
William L. Shirer
George Rothwell Brown
Fiorello H. LaGuardia 
Max Lerner 
Jennings Perry
Samuel Grafton 
Harold Ickes
James Reston
Royce Brier
Clif Stratton
Thomas L. Stokes
Marquis Childs 
Walter Lippmann 
Barnet Nover 
Eleanor Roosevelt
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AMBIVALENT
Cleveland Plain Dealer 
Denver Post 
New York Times
William F. McDermott 
M. W. Fodor 
Arthur Krock
Washington Times-Herald John O'Donnell
George E. Sokolsky
Washington Post Drew Pearson
Mark Sullivan
Washington Star Doris Fleeson
Frank R. Kent 
David Lawrence 
Lowell Mellett
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